北京工商大学学报
(
社会科学版
)2015
年
摇
第
5
期
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Founder鄄chairman
,
Control Structure and Corporate Investment Decision
ZHAO Zhen
(
Business School
,
University of International Business and Economics
,
Beijing 100029
,
China
)
Abstract
: Company鄄level control structure and individual characteristics of family business entrepreneurs affect the
company蒺s financial decisions. Using the family鄄run listed companies during the years from 2002 to 2010 as study sample, this
paper examines the effect of the founder鄄chairman and family control strucutre on corporate investment decision. The research
finds that the founder鄄chairman in family firms encourages the executives to fully seize the market opportunities in the process of
investment decision, and improve the efficiency of capital allocation. This effect is more pronounced in the companies under more
board control with family directors in excess and in the companies with lower seperation between family control rights and cash
flow right. Further study shows that the functional mechanism founder鄄chairman affects the efficiency of capital allocation is to im鄄
prove the sensitivity of executive compensation and performance, reduce the company蒺s agency cost and improve the effectiveness
of corporate governance.
Key Words
: founder鄄chairman; control structure; investment decision; executive compensation
(
本文责编
摇
王沈南
)
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