第
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第
5
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沈小燕
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Establishment of Remuneration Committee
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Nature of
Property Right and Executive Compensation
SHEN Xiaoyan
1
& WANG Yuetang
2
(
1. Business School
,
Nantong University
,
Nantong
,
Jiangsu 221019
,
China
;
2. Department of Accounting
,
Business School
,
Nanjing University
,
Nanjing
,
Jiangsu 210093
,
China
)
Abstract
: Based on the listed companies with voluntarily established remuneration committee, with the “Optimal Contract
Perspective冶 and the “Managers蒺 Power Theory冶, an empirical study is made in this paper and the findings are that: among the
state鄄owned enterprises, the listed companies where the remuneration committees are established have higher executive compensa鄄
tion鄄performance sensitivity, while it is opposite among the non鄄state鄄owned enterprises; in case of a further subdivision of state鄄
owned enterprises, among the state鄄owned enterprises controlled by central government, the listed companies with the setting of
remuneration committee have higher executive compensation鄄performance sensitivity, while it is opposite among the local state鄄
owned enterprises; with a further exploration into the relative performance and the change of performance, when the relative per鄄
formance is high and the performance is on the increase, the executive compensation鄄performance sensitivity is higher in the listed
companies with the setting of remuneration committee in the state鄄owned enterprises controlled by local government; when the rel鄄
ative performance is low and the performance is on the decrease, the listed companies with the setting of remuneration committee
in the state鄄owned enterprises controlled by central government have higher executive compensation鄄performance sensitivity,
which is on the contrary in the state鄄owned enterprises controlled by local government. This means the remuneration committee
has different effects on executive compensation鄄performance sensitivity in different nature of property right, in the state鄄owned en鄄
terprises controlled by central government or by local government, in different relative performance and performance change. The
remuneration committee established in the state鄄owned enterprises controlled by local government has empirical evidence to sup鄄
port the executives, which is in more conformity with the “Managers蒺 Power Theory冶.
Key Words
: establishment of remuneration committee; compensation鄄performance sensitivity; nature of property right; rela鄄
tive performance
(
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