第
30
卷
摇
第
1
期
苏
摇
玲
:
债权人监督与控股股东代理成本
效应
,
在对控股股股东代理成本的治理方面
,
银行
监督与法律环境具有一定的互补效
。
注
摇
释
:
淤
根据
CSMAR
中国股票市场研究数据库
、
Wind
数
据库
、
巨灵财经资讯数据库以及证券交易所信息公告统
计计算得到
。
于
由于篇幅限制
,
本部分未披露全部变量的描述性
统计结果
,
感兴趣的读者可以发送邮件
xjsuling@ 163. com
向作者索要
。
参考文献
:
[
1
]
封思贤
.
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,
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,
38
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1 - 36.
Creditor Supervision and Agency Cost of Controlling Shareholders
SU Ling
(
School of Accounting
,
Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics
,
Urumqi
,
Xinjiang 830012
,
China
)
Abstract
: With the research sample of China蒺s listed companies during the years from 2008 to 2010, an empirical model is
established to make an analysis. This study finds that bank supervision can effectively govern the agency cost of controlling share鄄
holders in the state鄄owned companies. For the non鄄state鄄owned holding companies, bank creditor governance is nullified. With
the introduction of internal governance model to examine the impact on agency cost of controlling shareholders, bank supervision
is found to have a significant governance effect. Equity check and balance has also a significant control effect. Legal environment
does not significantly inhibit the agency cost of controlling shareholders.
Key Words
: creditor supervision; controlling shareholder; agency cost
(
本文责编
摇
王沈南
)
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