北京工商大学学报
(
社会科学版
)摇 摇 摇 摇 2015
年
摇
第
1
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[
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.
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,
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):
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Block Shareholder蒺s Non鄄executive Directors and Governance
Efficiency in Board of Directors
:
Empirical Evidence from
China蒺s State鄄owned Listed Companies
WANG Bin
1
, SONG Chunxia
2
& MENG Huixiang
1
(
1. Business School
,
Beijing Technology and Business University
,
Beijing 100048
,
China
;
2. International Business School
,
University of International Business and Economics
,
Beijing 100029
,
China
)
Abstract
: The construction of Board of Directors in state鄄owned holding companies is one of key issues in the state鄄owned
assets management system reform. From the perspective of block shareholder蒺s non鄄executive directors ( BSNEDs), this paper
empirically tests the board governance efficiency of China蒺s state鄄owned listed companies. The research finds that as BSNEDs
nominated by the stated鄄owned block shareholder increase the excess seats in the Board of Directors, it not only has weakened the
independence and diversification of Board of Directors but also has incurred the altruism between the block shareholder and
BSNEDs as well as a higher agency cost. Eventually, it would impede the efficiency of the Board of Directors monitoring the man鄄
agement.
Key Words
: block shareholder蒺s non鄄executive directors (BSNEDs); excess seats; governance efficiency in Board of Di鄄
rectors
(
本文责编
摇
王沈南
)
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