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Alternative Shareholder Control
,
Connected Transaction and
Tunneling
:
Case Study on Connected Transactions
between Hainan Airlines and HNA Group
SHEN Zhenyu
1
& SONG Xiayun
2, 3
(
1. Institute of Accounting and Finance
,
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
,
Shanghai 200433
,
China
;
2. School of Business
,
Nanjing University
,
Nanjing
,
Jiangsu 210093
,
China
;
3. School of Accounting
,
Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics
,
Hangzhou
,
Zhejiang 310018
,
China
)
Abstract
: Due to the characteristics of China蒺s state鄄owned shareholders, there may be alternative shareholder control in the
state鄄owned companies as the largest shareholder. Under alternative shareholder control, the main agency problem is the interest
conflicts among alternative shareholder, controlling shareholder and other small and medium鄄sized shareholders. The alternative
shareholder may tunnel the listed company crazily. Hainan Airlines Co. Ltd. is classified as alternative shareholder control ac鄄
cording to its ownership structure, board members and executive composition. This paper studies the connected transactions be鄄
tween HNA Group and Hainan Airlines to clarify how HNA Group has tunneled Hainan Airlines by a series of connected transac鄄
tions. HNA Group obtains cash and gains profits from Hainan Airlines through a series of high value鄄added shares transferred to
Hainan Airlines. Those connected transactions has made Hainan Airlines hold too much cash resulting in too many debts to pay a
lot of interests, which reduces its profitability and even directly damages the interests of other shareholders. The research result
provokes a probe into the supervision of tunnel in listed companies through connected transactions, investor protection mecha鄄
nism, asset appraisal regulation, state鄄owned assets reform, etc. The research expands the theory research content of corporate
control rights, agency problem and tunneling theory and provides important practical guidance for listing corporation regulatory
and reform of state鄄owned assets.
Key Words
: shareholder control; connected transaction; tunneling
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