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Empirical Study on the Effect of Executive Team蒺s Internal
Pay Gap upon Investment Efficiency
—
Taking the State鄄owned A鄄share Listed Companies as Example
WANG Jianjun & LIU Hongxia
(
School of Accountancy
,
Central University of Finance and Economics
,
Beijing 100081
,
China
)
Abstract
: Under the background of China蒺s special institution, this article takes the sample of Chinese A鄄share listed com鄄
panies during the period from 2006 to 2013 to examine the effect of executive team蒺s internal pay gap on the investment efficiency
of the listed companies. The results find that properly widening executive team蒺s internal pay tap can curb the inefficient invest鄄
ment of the state鄄owned listed companies in China, and the pay gap mainly hinders the overinvestment, but have no obvious effect
on the underinvestment. However, the adverse effect of too wide internal pay gap within the executive team on the investment effi鄄
ciency cannot be neglected. This article finds that there is a turning point in the effect of the executive team蒺s internal pay gap on
inefficient investment of the state鄄owned A鄄share listed companies. Once the pay gap exceeds the turning point, it is positive in
the effect of the pay gap on inefficient investment. The study in this article provides empirical evidence for China蒺s state鄄owned
listed companies to work out their more reasonable pay gap. At the same time, it guides the direction to solve the problem of
managers蒺 stimuli in China蒺s state鄄owned enterprises.
Key Words
: executive team; relative pay gap; inefficient investment
(
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摇
王沈南
)
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