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第 35 卷摇 第 6 期 摇 摇 杜摇 勇, 张摇 路: 行政干预、晋升激励与过度投资

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Administrative Intervention, Promotion Incentive and Over鄄investment

DU Yong & ZHANG Lu
(South Business School, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510545, China)

Abstract: Combined with the unique institutional background of China, using the panel data of state鄄owned listed companies
in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the years from 2013 to 2018, using various empirical model,
this paper explores the relationship between the promotion incentive for executives in state鄄owned enterprises (SOEs) and the o鄄
ver鄄investment of enterprises. The results show that political promotion incentives can effectively restrain executives of the SOEs
from over鄄investment. Further research, taking administrative intervention as a moderating variable, has found that under strong
administrative intervention, political promotion incentives have no significant inhibitory effect on over鄄investment, however, when
the degree of administrative intervention faced by the SOEs is weakened, the inhibitory effect of political promotion incentive on
excessive investment is more significant. After a series of robust and endogenous tests, the research conclusion is still valid. This
research helps to reveal the internal mechanism between the development of the SOEs and political promotion. From the perspec鄄
tive of executives in the SOEs, political promotion is more attractive than salary, and it has a significant impact on the optimiza鄄
tion of SOEs蒺 investment efficiency.
Key Words: state鄄owned enterprise (SOE); administrative intervention; political promotion; promotion incentive; over鄄in鄄
vestment; investment efficiency

(本文责编摇 王沈南)

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