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北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)摇 摇 摇 摇 2020 年摇 第 3 期

上述行业以外的公司为市场竞争类。 372.
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Mixed Ownership Reform of State鄄owned Enterprises:
Current Situation and Theoretical Analysis

MAO Xinshu
(Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China)

Abstract: The reform of mixed ownership has increasingly become an important measure in the reform of state鄄owned enterprises
in China. But empirical evidence shows that the mixed ownership reform of the state鄄owned enterprises in China was carried out
prudently and slowly. It is difficult for the state鄄owned enterprise groups to price large equity with large asset size. The listed
companies, the average degree of their mixed ownership did not change substantially. On the contrary, the state鄄owned equity in
non鄄competitive industries such as electric power, telecommunications, oil and gas has increased in recent years because the
state鄄owned shareholders prefer to increase rather than sell their shares of listed companies with strong profitability. Then it analy鄄
zes the logic and theoretical basis of mixed ownership reform of state鄄owned enterprises from the perspective of resource comple鄄
mentarity and efficiency. Finally, it puts forward some ideas of promoting the reform of mixed ownership of the state鄄owned enter鄄
prises by classification and stratification, and believe that strengthening the information disclosure of state鄄owned enterprises has
become an important prerequisite and the basis for expedite the mixed reform.
Key Words: state鄄owned enterprises; mixed ownership; efficiency view; resource complementary view; shareholder re鄄
sources
(本文责编摇 潘端莲)

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