Page 84 - 《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第2期

第 35 卷摇 第 2 期 孔宁宁, 吴摇 蕾, 陈绾墨: 并购重组业绩承诺实施风险与中小股东利益保护

[10]潘爱玲,邱金龙,杨洋. 业绩补偿承诺对标的企 2000,90(2):22 - 27.
业的激励效应研究———来自中小板和创业板上市公司的 [19]李文洲,冉茂盛,黄俊. 大股东掏空视角下的薪
实证检验[J]. 会计研究,2017(3):46 - 52. 酬激励与盈余管理[J]. 管理科学,2014(6):27 - 39.
[11]刘浩,杨尔稼,麻樟城. 业绩承诺与上市公司盈 [20]郑国坚,林东杰,林斌. 大股东股权质押、占款
余管理[J]. 财经研究,2011(10):58 - 69. 与企业价值[J]. 管理科学学报,2014(9):72 - 87.
[12]赵立新,姚又文. 对重组盈利预测补偿制度的运 [21]高闯,孙宏英,胡可果. 并购重组中大股东补偿
行分析及完善建议[J]. 证券市场导报,2014(4):4 -8. 承诺与中小股东权益保护———基于苏宁环球与世荣兆业
[13]林勇峰, 鲁威朝, 陈汉文. 商誉与商誉减值:基 的比较案例研究[J]. 经济管理,2010(11):55 - 63.
于上市公司现状的深层分析[N]. 上海证券报, 2017鄄04鄄 [22]黄小勇,王玥,刘娟. 业绩补偿承诺与中小股东
15(4). 利益保护———以掌趣科技收购上游信息为例[J]. 江西社
[14]张冀. 深市重大资产重组业绩承诺及商誉情况 会科学,2018(6):48 - 57.
分析[J]. 证券市场导报,2017(11):28 - 32. [23]刘建勇,董晴. 资产重组中大股东承诺、现金补
[15]LA PORTA R,LOPEZ鄄DE鄄SILANE F,SHLEIFER 偿与中小股东利益保护———基于海润光伏的案例研究
A, et al. Law and finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy, [J]. 财贸研究,2014(1):136 - 142.
1998,106(6):1113 - 1155. [24]HOU Q,JIN Q,YANG R, et al. Performance com鄄
[16]陈炜,孔翔,许年行. 我国中小投资者法律保护 mitments of controlling shareholders and earnings management
与控制权私利关系实证检验[ J]. 中国工业经济,2008 [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2015, 32 ( 3 ):
(1):24 - 31. 1099 - 1127.
[17]刘少波. 控制权收益悖论与超控制权收益——— [25]李善民,朱滔. 多元化并购能给股东创造价值
对大股东侵害小股东利益的一个新的理论解释[J]. 经济 吗? ———兼论影响多元化并购长期绩效的因素[J]. 管理
研究,2007(2):85 - 96. 世界,2006(3):129 - 137.
[18] JOHNSON S,LA PORTA R,LOPEZ鄄DE鄄SILANE [26]郑晓媛,王军辉. 2017 年度上市公司重大资产重组
F, et al. Tunneling [ J ]. American Economic Review, 资产评估情况分析[J]. 中国资产评估,2018(6):25 -34.

Implementation Risks of Performance Commitments and

Protection of Minority Shareholders蒺 Benefits in Mergers
and Acquisitions: Taking Yabaite as an Example

KONG Ningning, WU Lei & CHEN Wanmo
(School of Business, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China)

Abstract: Performance Commitments (PC) have been widely used in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in China. Based on
the characteristics of the PC implementation at different stages, this paper constructs an analytical framework about the PC imple鄄
mentation risks and the protection of minority shareholders蒺 interests. Taking the case of Yabaite as an example, it examines the
mechanism and economic consequences regarding the potential risks of PC that influence the protection of minority shareholders蒺
interests. The research finds the coexistence of “high performance commitments and high valuation冶 in the early signing period,
with the disorder of valuation system and the failure of proactive supervision which might lead to difficulty in protecting the minori鄄
ty shareholders蒺 interests. The execution period is characterized by “low compliance rate冶 and “precise compliance冶, in which
there is a phenomenon that major shareholders might avoid the risk of compensation via earnings management, financial fraud or
pledge of restricted shares. Besides, the lack of legal provisions and extremely low penalty costs will be detrimental to the minori鄄
ty shareholders蒺 benefits. The research conclusions have policy implications to explore the potential risks of PC and its impact on
the protection of minority shareholders蒺 interests, optimize the design of multi鄄purpose PC contracts, establish a valuation adjust鄄
ment mechanism for M&A, strengthen information disclosure and supervision of intermediaries, and improve PC鄄related policies
and regulations.
Key Words: mergers and acquisitions (M&A); performance commitments (PC); implementation process; implementation
risk; protection of minority shareholders蒺 benefits; Yabaite
(本文责编摇 潘端莲)

· 7 9 ·