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Research on Effect of Tax Avoidance on Cash Holding Level and
its Valuation in China蒺s Listed Companies

1 2 3
WANG Pei , SU Lizhong & DING Dan
(1. China University of Petroleum Beijing, Beijing 102249, China;
2. School of Business, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China;
3. China Petroleum Finance Co. Ltd, Beijing 100007, China)

Abstract: With the listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the years from 2008
to 2016 as research object, this article explores the influence of tax avoidance on the cash holdings and the value of cash holdings
based on the theory of tax avoidance and cash holdings. The research finds that those companies with higher scores in tax avoid鄄
ance have relatively lower cash holdings and excess cash. There are significant differences between companies with redundant
cash and with insufficient cash. Further test finds that the companies with redundant cash have the problems such as information
opacity and weak supervision brought by the increased degree of tax avoidance to induce the opportunism of the management,
which also provides evidence for enterprises to use tax to avoid rent鄄seeking. Due to the existing agent problems and China蒺s spe鄄
cial taxation system, tax avoidance cannot increase the value of cash holdings. At the same time, the ownership structure can im鄄
pose some moderating impacts in this process. This paper proves the importance of corporate governance mechanism.
Key Words: tax avoidance; principal agent theory; cash holding level; value of cash holding; ownership structure

(本文责编摇 王沈南)

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