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The Impact of Executive鄄employee Compensation Gap on
Enterprise Performance: Regression Analysis Based on Threshold

Panel Model of China蒺s A鄄stock Listed Companies on Shanghai
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange

1 1 2
CAI Yun , CHEN Shuyu & REN Cheng
(1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China;
2. School of Social Welfare, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California, CA94720, USA)

Abstract: State鄄owned enterprises are the dominant force in the national economy, and their internal pay gap has a major
impact on many aspects of the enterprise. With the state鄄owned listed companies in the manufacturing industry during the years
from 2006 to 2017 as a sample, this paper uses the fixed鄄effect panel data model to study the relationship of the compensation gap
between executives and employees and enterprise performance. The threshold panel model is further used to explore the threshold
level about the incentive effect of the compensation gap on enterprise performance. The research shows that there is an inverted
“U冶鄄shaped relationship between the compensation gap of executives and employees and enterprise performance. The research
finds that the compensation gap has a positive incentive effect on enterprise performance, but when the compensation gap exceeds
a certain range, it has a negative impact on enterprise performance. This also shows that the relationship of the compensation gap
between executives and employees, and enterprise performance cannot be simply explained by the tournament theory or behavioral
theory. In addition, there is a significant threshold characteristic within the positive incentive effect range of the compensation
gap. Below the threshold value (32郾 216), the compensation gap has a stronger incentive effect on enterprise performance, and
the incentive effect weakens above the threshold value. The conclusions of the study indicate that the reform of state - owned en鄄
terprises should be deepened, the two elements of competition and fairness should be emphasized, and the salary gap interval
should be scientifically set to fully exert the positive incentive effect of the salary gap on corporate performance.
Key Words: compensation gap; enterprise performance; inverted U鄄shaped trend; incentive effect; threshold regression
model; tournament theory; social behavior theory

(本文责编摇 王沈南)

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