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北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)摇 摇 摇 摇 2019 年摇 第 1 期



               Research on Implementation Mechanism of Government

                Accounting Rules from Perspective of Contract Theory


                                        1           1             2
                               LU Junwei , BU Xiaoxia & LIU Huifang
                   (1郾 School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan, Shandong 250100, China;
                   2郾 School of Economics, Qingdao University, Qingdao, Shandong 266000, China)

       Abstract: The implementation mechanism of accounting rules is a set of alternatives to solve the problems of economic
   organizations蒺 accepting and implementing the general accounting rules fairly and impartially after the right to formulate accounting
   rules is assigned to third鄄party institutions. From the perspective of contract theory, it is found that effective accounting rule im鄄
   plementation mechanism should make the sum of information cost and agency cost of every economic organization reach “economic
   point冶. The implementation mechanism of accounting rules include coercive mechanism and pressure mechanism. The former re鄄
   lies on legislative and administrative authority while the latter relies on the pressure of economic organizations蒺 resource dependen鄄
   cy and, both of which have their own advantages and disadvantages. The set characteristics of government contracts determine the
   dual feature of government accounting rules, i. e. cash鄄based budgetary accounting system and accrual鄄based government ac鄄
   counting standards, with the former suitable for rigid coercive mechanism and the latter for flexible pressure mechanism. In Chi鄄
   na, the government budget contract has homogeneity while the debt contract has heterogeneity. Moreover, the government has
   more levels, large in quantities and the scale varies greatly. In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government ac鄄
   counting rules, we should choose and build differentiated implementation mechanisms for government budgetary accounting and
   government financial accounting separately according to government levels, contractual structure characteristics, etc.
       Key Words: government accounting; dual鄄track model; accounting rule; implementation mechanism; set of contract; ac鄄
   counting basis

                                                                          (本文责编摇 邓摇 艳)


   (上接第 39 页)
        Impact of Regional Culture on Information Disclosure of Corporate
           Social Responsibility: Evidence from China蒺s Listed Companies


                                          ZHANG Tingting
           (School of Accounting, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, Liaoning 116025, China)

       Abstract: As a kind of informal institutions, regional culture has significant impact on the quality of firm蒺s information dis鄄
   closure. Using the A鄄share listed companies in China during the years from 2009 to 2016 as research sample, this paper investi鄄
   gates the significant influence of different regional cultures on the quality of information disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibil鄄
   ity (CSR). Specifically speaking, if regional culture is more tolerant to power distance, the quality of CSR information disclosure
   is lower in the area. If regional culture is more performance鄄oriented, the quality of CSR information disclosure is lower in the ar鄄
   ea. If regional culture focuses more on gender equality, the disclosure quality of CSR is higher in the area. The findings in this
   paper are significantly enlightening to the deep understanding of relationship between informal institutions and firm蒺s information
   disclosure quality.
       Key Words: regional culture; institutional environment; informal institution; corporate social responsibility (CSR); volun鄄
   tary disclosure; information disclosure quality

                                                                          (本文责编摇 王沈南)


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