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第 34 卷摇 第 1 期            曹摇 宁, 李善民: 并购重组中内幕交易为何如此频繁?


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       Why Insider Trading is Rampant in M&A: An Empirical Study from
                               Perspective of Social Relations



                                              1
                                      CAO Ning & LI Shanmin 2
                    (1郾 Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hongkong 999077, China;
              2郾 Sun Yat鄄Sen Business School, Sun Yat鄄Sen University, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510275, China)

       Abstract: In recent years, insider information disclosure and insider trading behavior have not been rarely seen on China蒺s
   capital market, and research on their influencing factors has been heated topic. From the perspective of social capital and social
   relations, taking 218 listed companies as samples that have actually experienced the control transfer during the years from 2007 to
   2016, this paper empirically conducts a study on how the social relations of top executives affect insider trading in mergers and
   acquisitions (M&A) of listed companies. The empirical research shows that the social relations of top executives in listed compa鄄
   nies have significant impact on the degree of insider information disclosure. The social relations of top executives with government
   and financial institutions are both access to information disclosure. The richer the top executives蒺 experience in the government
   and financial institutions, the more serious the insider information disclosure behavior. At the same time, the research indicates
   that the persons who worked in the regulatory agency before entering the listed company as top executives can play a role in con鄄
   tainment of insider information disclosure. In order to effectively prevent illegal insider trading, the regulatory authority should re鄄
   gard the social relations of a company蒺s top executives in their careers as the focus of supervision and concern.
       Key Words: insider trading; insider information disclosure; social capital; social relations; mergers and acquisitions
   (M&A); control transfer

                                                                          (本文责编摇 王沈南)

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