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Research on the Protection of Founders蒺 Control Right in China蒺s

Internet Companies Listed on Stock Market of the USA:
Taking Alibaba蒺s Lakeside Partners System as an Example

ZHANG Jide & LIU Zhuo
(Business School/ State鄄owned Assets Management Synergy Innovation Centre, Beijing Technology and
Business University, Beijing 100048, China)

Abstract: The protection of founder蒺s controlling right in the Internet companies plays a significant role in maintaining the
stability of top management, giving full play to entrepreneurship and enhancing the market competitiveness. How the Dual Class
Structure in Alibaba can protect the founder蒺s controlling right has been of great concern among theorists and practitioners. This
paper clarifies the organizational structure and function mechanism in Alibaba蒺s Lakeside Partners to make a probe into the simi鄄
larities and differences between Lakeside Partners and Dual Class Structure. The research finds that: Lakeside Partners system
entitles the founders to select their partners and nominate the members of directors of board which gives better protection of
founders蒺 control right in Internet companies; Lakeside Partners system has more protection for founders蒺 control right in Internet
companies than AB share in all aspects. This paper can be of reference to Internet companies in protection for their founders蒺 con鄄
trol right, and provide the basis for regulatory authorities to make such policy.
Key Words: alibaba; internet companies; control right protection; Lakeside Partners system; dual class structure
(本文责编摇 王沈南)

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