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第 35 卷摇 第 4 期 摇 摇 摇 摇 潘凌云, 董摇 竹: 控股股东持股比例如何影响企业生产率

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How Shareholding Ratio of Controlling Shareholder
Affect Firm Productivity

PAN Lingyun & DONG Zhu
(Jilin University, Changchun, Jilin 130012, China)

Abstract: The continuous improvement of firm productivity can help enterprises to obtain excess profits in the fierce market
competition, thereby creating higher value for shareholders. Based on the data of China蒺s listed companies during the years from
2007 to 2018, the effect of controlling shareholder蒺s shareholding ratio on firm productivity was studied. The research results show
that the increase in the shareholding ratio of the controlling shareholder promotes the improvement of firm productivity. Further re鄄
search on the mechanism of action has found that among companies with fewer analysts tracking, lower product market competi鄄
tion, and audits conducted by small firms, the controlling shareholder蒺s shareholding ratio has a more significant role in promoting
firm productivity, indicating that the controlling shareholder蒺s shareholding can promote firm productivity through the monitoring
effect. Regulatory departments should be fully aware of the important role played by the shareholding structure in the process of
firm productivity, and further strengthen the protection for investors. Also, the listed companies should pay more attention to im鄄
proving the level of governance, continuously optimizing the equity structure and improving firm productivity.
Key Words: firm productivity; controlling shareholder; monitoring effect; analyst tracking; product market competition;
scale of accounting firm

(本文责编摇 潘端莲)

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