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第 35 卷摇 第 2 期 王摇 斌: 股东资源与公司财务理论

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Shareholder蒺s Resources and Corporate Financial Theory

WANG Bin
(Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China)

Abstract: The influences of reform and opening鄄up policy show that capital has never been the mere production factor, and
it is the flow carrier of other productive elements. Similarly, the shareholders are not merely the financial capital provider, and it
is also the carrier of shareholder蒺s resources. In this perspective, this paper brings forward a new concept of “Shareholder蒺s Re鄄
sources冶 (SRs) and discusses it to a new extension of financial theory. This paper states that SRs are a mass of heterogeneous
and complementary resources such as financial capital, intangible resources (including social capital and unique resources), or鄄
ganizational ability, etc. which are owned or controlled by the big shareholders. The prevalent fact of big shareholders in Chinese
companies shows that companies are essentially the big resourceful鄄shareholders蒺 coalition. In this contextual, the financial mech鄄
anism between the big shareholders and company蒺s value creation will be logically constructed: the big shareholder level蒺s SRs to
be gathered as the firm level蒺s SRs, through which strengthening the absorption of other dynamics and to form the firm蒺s unique re鄄
sources, makes the firm possible to transfer all resources into competitive edge. Corporate governance is essentially the collabora鄄
tive mechanism under the direction of resourceful鄄shareholders coalition. The SR concept and the extended financial logic have
provided a brand鄄new perspective or paradigm to observe company operation. The SR outlook is helpful to the deep understanding
and active exploration of mixed ownership reform in the state鄄owned enterprises.
Key Words: shareholder蒺s resources; corporate governance; financial theory; state鄄owned enterprise (SOE); mixed owner鄄
ship reform

(本文责编摇 潘端莲)

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