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第 35 卷摇 第 1 期 周泽将, 汪摇 帅: 本地独立董事能否有效抑制国有企业高管在职消费?

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Can Local Independent Directors Effectively Inhibit Non鄄pecuniary

Compensation by Executives in China蒺s SOEs?

ZHOU Zejiang & WANG Shuai
(School of Business, Anhui University, Hefei, Anhui 230601, China)

Abstract: As an important part of corporate governance mechanism, whether the supervisory function of independent direc鄄
tors can be effectively exerted has long been a matter of great concern. Based on this, with the 5 489 observation data of A鄄share
state鄄owned listed companies during the years from 2010 to 2016 on China蒺s capital market, from a unique perspective of local
tenure, this paper empirically tests the effect of local independent directors on non鄄pecuniary compensation by executives and the
moderating effect of political connections and government subsidies. The results show that the local independent directors inhibit
the non鄄pecuniary compensation by executives significantly in China蒺s SOEs and political connections weaken the negative effect of
local independent directors on non鄄pecuniary compensation, but government subsidies enhance the above relation. Further tests
find that inhibiting the non鄄pecuniary compensation partly plays a mediator role in the process of local Independent directors af鄄
fecting the business performance in SOEs. Accordingly, SOEs, especially those with high government subsidies, should attach
importance to the appointment of local independent directors and fully utilizes their supervisory functions so that managers蒺 non鄄
pecuniary compensation can be effectively constrained. Meanwhile, attention should be also paid to the possible negative effect of
political connections.
Key Words: local independent director; state鄄owned enterprise (SOE); non鄄pecuniary compensation; political connec鄄
tions; government subsidy; business performance

(本文责编摇 潘端莲)

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