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北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)摇 摇 摇 摇 2020 年摇 第 1 期

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Research on Impact of Executive Incentives on Chinese Enterprises蒺

Overseas Ambidextrous Strategy: Empirical Study Based on
Executive Incentives and Tenure

1 2 3
LIU Ying , 摇 GAO Qiuling & SHEN Kai
(1. School of Finance, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China;
2. Business School, Beijing International Studies University, Beijing 100024, China;
3. China International Telecommunication Construction Corporation, Beijing 100079, China)

Abstract: It has been long for the research on the overseas ambidextrous strategy while exploration of the mechanism be鄄
tween executive incentives and ambidextrous strategy is far from enough. Based on the theories of principal鄄agent theory and moti鄄
vation theory, this paper starts from the perspective of executive incentive by using the panel data of China蒺s manufacturing A鄄
share listed companies during the years from 2006 to 2017. It focuses on the influence of equity incentive and private benefit of
control exerting on the dynamic balance of overseas ambidextrous strategy in multi鄄national companies as well as its mechanism.
The conclusions are as follows. The equity incentive is positively related to the dynamic balance of overseas ambidextrous strate鄄
gy. The relationship between the firm蒺s overseas ambidextrous strategy and private benefit of control shows an inverse U鄄shape;
The TMT蒺s tenure negatively moderates the relationship between executive incentive and enterprise蒺s ambidexterity. Multinational
enterprises can fully utilize the supplementary effect between executive tenure and incentives to maximize incentives by a manage鄄
ment system. This research has contribution to foreign direct investment theory in emerging economy as well as corporate govern鄄
ance theory, providing a fresh insight for increasing ambidexterity and performance of Chinese multinational companies.
Key Words: executive incentives; overseas ambidextrous strategy; dynamic balance; motivation theory; equity incentive;
private benefit of control; executive tenure

(本文责编摇 王沈南)

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