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北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)摇 摇 摇 摇 2019 年摇 第 5 期

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[25] 郑珺,蒲俊梅,曹瑾. 非经常性收益列报管制下

Executive Compensation Contracts and Classification Shifting:
Evidence Based on A Quasi鄄natural Experiment

YE Kangtao & LIU Yurou
(Business School, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China)

Abstract: This paper utilizes a natural experiment setting arising from the change in the executive performance evaluation
policy for central government鄄owned enterprises (CGOE) in 2006 and examines the impact of accounting classification shifting on
executive incentive contracts. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies during the years from 2005 to 2009 and a difference鄄in鄄
differences approach, we find that CGOEs shift income from extraordinary items to core earnings after the policy change to boost
core earnings. Further analyses suggest that CGOEs蒺 core earnings do not improve in the subsequent periods, again supporting the
accounting classification shifting hypothesis. Finally, we find that top executive compensations in CGOEs are positively associated
with the extent of classification shifting, indicating that top executives boost their compensations through accounting classification
shifting. Our findings have policy implications for the improvement of performance evaluation system in CGOEs, which is that
SASAC should base the incentive contract on those accounting targets that are less subject to classification shifting, and strengthen
the accounting & auditing supervision to prevent classification shifting behavior so as to enhance the effectiveness of CGOEs蒺 per鄄
formance evaluation methods.
Key Words: extraordinary items; classification shifting; earnings management; performance evaluation; executive compen鄄
sation; central government鄄owned enterprises (CGOE)

(本文责编摇 潘端莲)

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