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第 34 卷摇 第 2 期摇 刘新民, 孙田田, 王摇 垒: 终极超额控制与大股东的竞合关系对公司债务期限决策的影响

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The Influence of Co鄄opetition Relationship between Ultimate

Excess Controller and Major Shareholders upon Decision鄄making
of Company蒺s Debt Maturity

1 2 3
LIU Xinmin , SUN Tiantian & WANG Lei
(School of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, Shandong 266590, China)

Abstract: Taking China蒺s A鄄share listed companies in the years from 2010 to 2016 as research sample, this paper empirical鄄
ly tests the impact of Co鄄opetition relationship between ultimate controllers and major shareholders on a company蒺s debt maturity
structure. The research results show that there is a positive “U冶鄄type relationship between ultimate excess control and company蒺s
debt maturity. The competitiveness formed by the major shareholders and the ultimate controller is negatively related to the struc鄄
ture of the company蒺s debt maturity, and the major shareholders and the short鄄term creditors conduct the self鄄interest behavior of
the ultimate controller. The constraint but binding force is significantly weakened when the ultimate controller is the government
shareholder and the ultimate controller is the absolute controlling shareholder. The nature of the second largest shareholder and
the ultimate controller is consistent with the corporate debt maturity structure. At this time, the majority shareholder and the ulti鄄
mate controller are more likely to form a “collusion冶 relationship. Further research finds that when the second largest shareholder
is a trust shareholder, it is easier to act as a “bystander冶 and the effect on the company蒺s debt maturity is weakened and no longer
significant. When the second largest shareholder is a beneficiary shareholder, it has formed an obvious “competitive冶 relationship
with the ultimate controller, and the effect on the company蒺s debt maturity has increasingly enhanced.
Key Words: ultimate controller; major shareholder; excess control; debt maturity; joint governance; Co鄄opetition relation鄄
ship

(本文责编摇 王沈南)

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