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第 33 卷摇 第 5 期 钱爱民, 朱大鹏: 高管政治晋升预期与普通职工薪酬

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Top Executives蒺 Political Promotion Expectation and Rank鄄and鄄File

Employees蒺 Compensation: Empirical Evidence from
State鄄owned Listed Companies

QIAN Aimin & ZHU Dapeng
(Business School, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China)

Abstract: Using the state鄄owned listed companies during the years from 2007 to 2016 as a research sample, this paper in鄄
vestigates the effect of top executive蒺s political promotion expectation on rank鄄and鄄file employees蒺 compensation. The empirical re鄄
sults show that top executive蒺s political promotion expectation is significantly negative related with employees蒺 compensation.
When top executives蒺 political promotion expectation is high, the pay performance sensitivity of rank鄄and鄄file employees is signifi鄄
cantly attenuated. Further research finds that: compared with the SOEs controlled by central government, the negative effect of
political promotion expectation on the employees蒺 compensation and pay performance sensitivity is greater in SOEs controlled by
local government. When the top executives蒺 political promotion expectation is relatively high, it tends to the low鄄efficiency overin鄄
vestment. The larger the scale of investment by an enterprise, the lower the rank鄄and鄄file employees蒺 compensation. The research
conclusions not only provide the direct empirical evidence to prove that top executives蒺 political promotion expectation aggravates
the agency conflict between management and employees, but also have the important enlightenment to the improvement of incen鄄
tive mechanism of top executives蒺 political promotion in the state鄄owned enterprises and the protection of employees蒺 interests.
Key Words: political promotion expectation; employees蒺 compensation; compensation鄄performance sensitivity; agency con鄄
flict; investment decision; state鄄owned enterprise

(本文责编摇 王沈南)

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