Page 60 - 《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第6期

第 35 卷摇 第 6 期 李宇立, 梁摇 娟, 袁晓红: 互捐行为中捐出方的运行效率

Operational Efficiency of Donators under Interactive Donation Based on

Corporate Background Charity Foundations

LI Yuli,摇 LIANG Juan & YUAN Xiaohong
(School of Accounting, Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics, Urumqi, Xinjiang 830012, China)

Abstract: There is a common phenomenon of mutual donation among charity foundations. Based on the I鄄P鄄O model and the
Rank Sum Ratio (RSR) method, with corporate background and paired non鄄corporate background foundations during the years
from 2015 to 2018 as samples, this paper respectively measures the resource acquisition ability, organization management effi鄄
ciency, project operation efficiency and comprehensive operation efficiency of charity foundations. This study has found that the
comprehensive operation efficiency of corporate background charity foundations as donors in interactive donations is significantly
higher than other charity foundations. Among them, by relying on the sponsors of enterprises, corporate background foundations
have obtained strong resource acquisition capabilities and organizational management efficiency. The donated foundations with in鄄
teractive donations have provided channels for the output of public welfare resources to improve the efficiency of project opera鄄
tions. However, in corporate foundations that make big donations to other foundations, the accumulation of charitable resources is
obvious. The positive efficiency generated by resource dependence and the efficiency loss caused by the overlapping principal鄄a鄄
gent relationship coexist, and the possibility of “ pseudo鄄efficiency冶 could not be ruled out. The regulatory authorities should
strengthen the supervision on the donation behavior and information disclosure among charity foundations, as well as the supervi鄄
sion on the use of donated funds, which contributes to the improving the efficiency of social resource allocation.
Key Words: interactive donation; resource dependence; principal鄄agent; efficiency; Rank Sum Ratio ( RSR); charity
foundation
(本文责编摇 潘端莲)

(上接第 41 页)

Supplier鄄Customer Relationship and Agency Costs Based on
Moderating Role of Incentives for Executives

LIN Zhonggao & QIU Yuemin
(School of Business, Anhui University of Technology, Ma蒺anshan, Anhui 243002, China)

Abstract: As a typical mode of transactions between Chinese enterprises, it is still unclear how relational transaction affects
agency costs. Taking the A鄄share listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the years
from 2012 to 2018 as the sample, the impact of supplier鄄customer relationships on agency costs is studied. The research finds
that relational transaction and two types of agency costs are of an obvious U鄄shape relationship. That is, the two types of agency
costs decrease at the initial stage of relational transaction, but increase as the degree of relational transaction exceeds the turning
point. Further study finds that executive shareholding has a positive regulating effect on the relationship between relational trans鄄
actions and the first鄄type agency costs, but it has no significant regulating effect on the second鄄type agency costs. The changes
between supplier鄄customer relationship and agency costs provide the empirical evidence on how two cooperative parties grasp prop鄄
erly the relational transactions in both depth and frequency so that relational transactions can play a role to the maximum. The
companies should realize the impact of executive shareholding on agency costs, and give full play to the inhibitory effect of it on
the first type of agency costs.
Key Words: supply chain; relational transaction; agency cost; incentive for executives; executive shareholding
(本文责编摇 潘端莲)

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