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第 34 卷摇 第 5 期    李实, 徐晓静, 贾晗睿: 基本养老保险缴费不平衡对居民收入不平等的影响



               The Imbalance of Pension Contribution in China and Its
                         Impact on Residents蒺 Income Inequality


                                  LI Shi, XU Xiaojing & JIA Hanrui
                        (Business School, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China)

       Abstract: Using the survey data of China Income Distribution Project in 2013 (CHIP2013), this paper studies China蒺s pen鄄
   sion payment system, its income distribution effect and imbalance situation among Chinese labor force population. The findings
   are as follows: (1) The inequality of the residents蒺 pension contributions is relatively high, and the rural imbalance is greater
   than that of urban areas. Although the new rural social pension insurance is the main type of insurance of the society, the amount
   of national pension insurance is mainly contributed by the urban employee pension insurance. (2) The pension insurance pay鄄
   ment system has widened the income gap within urban areas, but its redistribution effect in rural areas is not obvious. On the
   whole, it narrows the income gap between urban and rural areas and thus reduces national income inequality. (3) The decompo鄄
   sition results show that the difference between systems is the most effective way to reduce the imbalance of pension contribution.
   In other words, it is the way to reduce pension payment inequality as well as national income inequality that we establish a unified
   basic pension insurance system for urban and rural residents across the country and implement a “pay more and get more冶 subsi鄄
   dy policy.
       Key Words: pension contribution; new rural social pension; urban employee pension; income gap; Theil decomposition;
   inequal decomposition based on regression
                                                                          (本文责编摇 王摇 轶)


   (上接第 80 页)



           Social Responsibility Information Disclosure and Financing Cost


                                        1              2            1
                             XIAO Xiang , ZHAO Tianjiao & JIA Lihuan
               (1郾 School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China;
     2郾 Donlinks School of Economics and Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China)

       Abstract: Based on the sample of A鄄share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange dur鄄
   ing the years from 2010 to 2015, this paper dynamically examines the influencing factors for the voluntary disclosure of Corporate
   Social Responsibility (CSR) report and the differences in economic consequences from the perspective of financing cost. The re鄄
   sults show that there is an inter鄄temporal influence between CSR information disclosure and financing cost. One of the intrinsic
   motivations for voluntary disclosure of social responsibility information is to reduce the financing cost. Both the voluntary and
   mandatory disclosure of the social responsibility reports have an effect on reducing the financing cost of the company. Active so鄄
   cial responsibility disclosure is helpful to further reducing the financing cost. But the conclusion that the higher the report quality,
   the more beneficial the financing cost is reduced is only significant in the firms with voluntary disclosure. Moreover, corporate
   governance and environmental uncertainty play a positive and negative moderating role respectively with regard to the relationship
   between CSR disclosures and financing cost. This paper takes the casual effect between CSR disclosure and financing cost into
   consideration, and the conclusion is helpful for firms to improve the financing situation and enhance the long鄄term financial per鄄
   formance.
       Key Words: corporate social responsibility (CSR); information disclosure; financing cost; voluntary disclosure; mandatary
   disclosure; interactive and inter鄄temporal influence
                                                                          (本文责编摇 王摇 轶)

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