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The Role of Financial Analysts in Firms蒺 Risk鄄taking:
Governance or Pressure

1 1 2 1
YANG Daoguang , WANG Jinmei , GONG Ziliang & CHEN Hanwen
(1郾 International Business School, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China;
2郾 Graduate School of Art and Sciences, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA 10027)

Abstract: The current empirical studies based on foreign data still exists the debate on the role of financial analysts in cor鄄
porate risk taking. “Governance Hypothesis冶 and “Pressure Hypothesis冶 predict that financial analysts蒺 tracking will improve or
inhibit firms蒺 risk鄄taking respectively. In order to test the adaptability of the hypothesis above in China, this paper takes the sam鄄
ple of Chinese nonfinancial listed firms for empirical research, and finds that financial analysts蒺 tracking improves firms蒺 risk鄄tak鄄
ing, and such effect is more pronounced in non鄄high鄄tech firms and those in monopoly industries, which indicates that “Govern鄄
ance Hypothesis冶 of financial analysts蒺 tracking dominates Chinese capital market. Further analysis shows that financial analysts蒺
tracking has increased the firm value by improving their risk鄄taking and there is no significant difference among different firms and
industries mentioned above. After alternating the related variables and controlling for potential endogeneity problems, the research
conclusion remains robust. This paper provides concrete evidence on how financial analysts蒺 tracking affects firms蒺 value鄄creating
activities and has important implication for the improvement of public firm蒺s external governance ecology and the development of
the industry of financial analysts.
Key Words: analyst; risk鄄taking; governance; pressure; firm value; innovation

(本文责编摇 王沈南)

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