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北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)摇 摇 摇 摇 2018 年摇 第 6 期

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Effectiveness Analysis of Regulation on Senior Executive蒺s Remuneration in
State鄄owned Enterprises Based on Perspectives from Both Government蒺s

Preference for Equity and State鄄owned Enterprises蒺 Performance

1 2 3
LI Liang , MA Wenbo & TANG Mengwei
(1郾 School of Economics, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China; 2郾 Adfaith, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510623, China;
3郾 PKUSZ, Shenzhen, Guangdong 518057, China)

Abstract: At present, most regions in China have implemented the regulation of senior executive蒺s remuneration in the state鄄
owned enterprises. There are different opinions about this policy蒺s effectiveness in current literatures, while the theoretical analy鄄
sis are few. None of those literatures have considered the effectiveness from the perspective of both equity and performance. In
our theoretical model, the utility of government stems from the state鄄owned enterprises蒺 profits, public services, and fairness of
distribution. While senior executives蒺 utility stems from two kinds of efforts and two kinds of government incentives. This model
suggests that limiting executives蒺 pay in the state鄄owned enterprises would reduce the distribution gap between senior executives
and the public, as well as between executives and ordinary employees, and reduce corporate efficiency. The shrink of distribution
gap will increase government蒺s utility, while the decline of corporates蒺 efficiency will reduce government蒺s utility. Based on the
theoretical model, DID method is used to verify the policy蒺s effect according to the data during the years from 2008 to 2016. We
find that the pay control policy has significantly reduced the distribution gap and corporate performance. Further analysis shows
that the absolute compensation of executives is positively related to corporates蒺 performance, while the relative remuneration is
negatively related to corporates蒺 performance. Theoretical model and empirical test show that there is inconsistency between
government蒺s goals and corporates蒺 goals. How to solve the contradiction between government utility and corporate performance has
become a major problem that the state鄄owned enterprises must face. This study is of great significance to the reform of the income
distribution in the state鄄owned enterprises.
Key Words: state鄄owned enterprises (SOEs); regulation of senior executives蒺 remuneration; government utility; preference
for fairness; enterprise performance; income distribution reform
(本文责编摇 王沈南)

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