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The Impact of Short Selling Pressure on the Choice of Corporate Bond Term

———Evidence from Quasi鄄natural Experiments in China蒺s Deregulation of Short Selling

WANG Panna, XU Botao & YIN Changping
(Accounting College, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China)

Abstract: After deregulation of short sales, investors can profit from investing in the capital market by mining the company蒺s
“bad news冶,in the situation where short sales are allowed, the company蒺s internal shareholders and management face increasing
downward pressure on stock prices and will actively take action to avoid risk of being shorted. With the help of quasi鄄natural ex鄄
periments in China蒺s securities market that began to gradually relax short鄄selling controls in 2010, using listed companies from
2007 to 2015 as sample, the impact of short鄄selling pressure on corporate bond contracts. The study finds that: deregulation of
short sales is significantly negatively relates to the maturity of corporate bonds, especially when the proportion of large
shareholders蒺 holdings is higher and the management market is under greater pressure. Further analysis find that, deregulation of
short sales is significantly negatively relates to the corporate debt maturity structure, indicating that deregulation of short sales will
prompt companies to shorten the maturity of issuing bonds. The results of the study show that, in the face of downward pressure on
stock prices caused by deregulation of short sales, in order to avoid the risk of short sales, the company蒺s major shareholders and
management will actively choose to shorten the bond issuance period to transmit signals, confirming that the short sales mecha鄄
nism can improve market information environment positive effect. The government can strengthen the construction and supervision
of the short鄄selling mechanism, promote the adjustment of corporate decision鄄making behaviors, and reduce information asymme鄄
try.
Key Words: pressure of short sale; choice of corporate bond term; signal transmission; external governance; bond contract

(本文责编摇 潘端莲)

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