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北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)摇 摇 摇 摇 2018 年摇 第 6 期


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                    Controlling Shareholders蒺 Stock Pledge, Analyst
                              Attention and Dividend Policies



                                              1             2
                                      SONG Di & YANG Chao
                      (1郾 Business School, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China;
              2郾 School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China)


       Abstract: The controlling shareholders of listed companies have increasingly carried out stock pledge, which has gradually
   become important financing method. Based on the data of listed companies from 2008 to 2017 on China蒺s A鄄stock market, this pa鄄
   per examines the relationship between controlling shareholders蒺 stock pledge and the dividend policies of listed companies. We
   find that the higher the percentage of stock pledge by controlling shareholders, the higher the proportion of cash dividends of lis鄄
   ted companies and the lower the proportion of stock dividends. Further analysis finds that analyst attention has an inhibitory effect
   on the relationship between controlling shareholders蒺 stock pledge and dividend policies, and the higher the degree of attention of
   securities analysts, the lower the positive relationship between controlling shareholders蒺 stock pledge and cash dividends, and the
   lower the negative relationship between the controlling shareholder蒺s stock pledge and stock dividends. The conclusion not only
   enriches the current research on dividend policies from the perspective of stock pledge, but also analyzes the influence of analyst
   attention on the controlling shareholders蒺 stock pledge behavior and the development of dividend policy. This paper makes up for
   the shortcomings that the current researches only with the focus on the controlling shareholders蒺 stock pledge and economic conse鄄
   quences from the perspective of corporate internal governance, and expands the research boundary of the current hot topics in the
   capital market of stock pledge.
       Key Words: controlling shareholders; stock pledge; analyst attention; cash dividend; stock dividend; corporate control
   transfer


                                                                          (本文责编摇 王沈南)






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