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北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)摇 摇 摇 摇 2020 年摇 第 2 期

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Informal Institution, Marketization and Government Subsidy:
Empirical Evidence from A鄄Share Listed Companies in China

1
HE Li & FENG Ke 2
(1. School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;
2. School of Economics, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China)

Abstract: Political connection, serving as an important informal institution, will cause distortion of the allocation of govern鄄
ment subsidies as scarce resources. However, the process of marketization with the continuous construction and improvement of a
formal institution, can optimize such allocation. In view of the above鄄mentioned issue, the data of Chinese A鄄share listed compa鄄
nies during the years from 2008 to 2017 is used to conduct the quantitative analysis. The research finds the following conclusions.
Firstly, companies with more political connections enjoy more government subsidies. That is to say, companies with more political
connections will take the advantage of their political resources to get more government subsidies. Moreover, the government蒺s dis鄄
cretion will allocate subsidies to the companies with more political connections, which thereby causes the distortion of resource al鄄
location. Secondly, the degree of marketization of the company蒺s location weakens the positive impact of political connection on
government subsidies. Based on the above research conclusion, it is suggested that we should avoid distortions of allocation of
government subsides caused by informal institution like political connection, continue to promote the process of marketization,
promote the continuous improvement of the formal institution and finally optimize the allocation of government subsidy resources.
Key Words: informal institution; political connection; marketization; government subsidy; resource allocation; formal in鄄
stitution
(本文责编摇 王摇 轶)

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