Page 129 - 《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第6期

北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)摇 摇 摇 摇 2020 年摇 第 6 期

Market Definition of Transactional Platform in Enterprise Regulation:
Taking an Example of Online Ride鄄hailing

YI Fang,摇 MENG Chang & CHEN Liyue
(School of Economics, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China)

Abstract: Online platform transaction is a typical two鄄sided platform. For horizontal and centralized Merger and Acquisition
(M&A) review on platform enterprises, the core work is market definition. Based on typical facts and features of transactional
platform, this paper analyzes the suitability of SSNIP for the two鄄sided market. The results have found that SSNIP is still suitable
for transactional platform. Although the competing enterprises such as Meituan and Gaode which have similar users has tried ac鄄
cess to the market, we do not suggest them included in the relevant market. Granger test and demand system estimation has indi鄄
cated that the user number on both sides are affected by each other, and the indirect net effect appears on the fourth day. The ac鄄
tual elasticity estimated by the demand system is smaller than the critical elasticity, thus the online platform for tailored ride鄄hai鄄
ling should be an independent relevant market. In view of the huge amount of data accumulated on China蒺s Internet platform, the
anti鄄monopoly law enforcement agencies can improve the efficiency and accuracy of the definition analysis by adding quantitative
evidence in the relevant market definition combined with quantitative methods.
Key Words: transactional online platform; market definition; online car鄄hailing platform; SSNIP method; critical elasticity
(本文责编摇 王沈南)

(上接第 67 页)

Fair Value Changes, Marketization Extent and Audit Fee

1 1 2
MA Jianwei ,摇 LI Jiang & JIANG Nannan
(1. School of Economics and Management, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou, Gansu 730050, China;
2. Changqing College, Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics, Lanzhou, Gansu 730020, China)

Abstract: At present, there is the regional imbalance in the marketization in China. The extents of marketization due to the
geographic locations lead to different degrees of difficulty in obtaining information required by fair value auditing, which affects
audit cost and audit risk. By using the related data of A鄄share listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange during the years from 2008 to 2016, this paper studies the relationship between fair value changes, marketization de鄄
gree and audit fees, and finds that: (1) The higher the fair value measurement volume is, the higher the audit fee is; (2) The
higher the marketization extent is in the area where the company is located, the higher the audit fee is; (3) There is a moderating
effect of the marketization extent of the geographic location of the listed companies on fair value changes and audit fees, i. e. the
higher the marketization extent is, the smaller the impact of fair value changes is on audit fee; (4) The volume of fair value
changes and the marketization extent of the geographic location have a bigger impact on the audit fees in the state鄄owned enterpri鄄
ses than in private enterprises. The research conclusion indicates that the accounting firms should determine the standard of audit
fees based on the marketization extent of the geographic location, and that the state鄄owned enterprises, by choosing their operation
in the areas of higher marketization extent, can effectively reduce the audit risks resulting from fair value measurement and then
reduce the audit fee premium.
Key Words: fair value change; marketization extent; audit fee; audit risk; audit cost; ownership
(本文责编摇 王沈南)

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