| 鲍宇,蒋艳.政府财会监督与资本市场信息效率——基于股价同步性的研究[J].北京工商大学社科版,2026,41(3):75-89 |
| 政府财会监督与资本市场信息效率——基于股价同步性的研究 |
| Government Accounting Supervision and Capital Market Information Efficiency:A Study Based on Stock Price Synchronicity |
| 投稿时间:2025-07-31 |
| DOI:10.12085/j.issn.1009-6116.2026.03.007 |
| 中文关键词: 政府财会监督 成本变化 信息效率 股价同步性 信息披露 |
| 英文关键词:government accounting supervision cost variation information efficiency stock price synchronicity information disclosure |
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| 摘要点击次数: 46 |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 从严打击资本市场财务造假是全面落实新“国九条”关于“严格上市公司持续监管”要求的必要条件,而政府财会监督是防范财务造假、维护市场诚信的重要防线。利用财政部会计信息质量随机检查制度所提供的独特场景,基于2007—2023年中国A股上市企业数据,从股价同步性视角考察了政府财会监督对资本市场信息效率的影响。研究发现,政府财会监督带来的风险及成本的提升引发了企业的策略性信息披露行为,企业特质信息减少,股价同步性提升,资本市场信息效率下降。异质性分析发现,政府财会监督的上述影响在面临较大业绩压力及管理层持股比例较高的企业中更为显著。进一步分析发现,企业通过管理层讨论与分析、业绩预告及投资者关系管理等自愿性信息披露场景传递企业特质信息的意愿降低,股票流动性下降。因此,监管机构应及时识别企业可能的策略性反应并有针对性地持续优化监管方式,进而实现提升财会监督工作成效和更好地发挥财会监督职能的目标。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| Stringently combating financial fraud in the capital market is a prerequisite for fully implementing the requirement of “strengthening ongoing supervision over listed companies” stipulated in the new “National Nine Guidelines”. Government accounting supervision serves as a vital line of defense to guard against financial fraud and uphold market integrity. Taking the random inspection system of accounting information quality implemented by the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China as a unique research setting, and employing the data of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2023, this paper empirically examines the impact of government accounting supervision on capital market information efficiency from the perspective of stock price synchronicity. The results show that the increasing risks and costs arising from government accounting supervision induce firms to adopt strategic information disclosure behaviors, which reduce firm-specific information, raise stock price synchronicity, and lower capital market information efficiency. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the above effects of government accounting supervision are more pronounced in firms under greater performance pressure and those with higher levels of managerial ownership. Further analysis indicates that firms are less willing to convey firm-specific information through voluntary information disclosure channels, such as management discussion and analysis, earnings forecasts, and investor relations management, and the stock liquidity declines. Therefore, regulatory authorities should timely identify possible strategic responses of firms and continuously optimize supervision methods in a targeted manner, so as to improve the effectiveness of accounting supervision and give full play to its functions. |
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