随机监管能够约束上市公司策略性文本信息披露吗？——基于证监会随机现场检查的准自然实验

Can Random Supervision Constrain Strategic Textual Disclosure of Listed Firms? —A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the CSRC's Random On-site Inspections

中文关键词:  随机监管  证监会随机现场检查  策略性文本信息披露  监管处罚力度  市场压力  媒体报道

英文关键词:random supervision  CSRC's random on-site inspections  strategic textual disclosure  regulatory penalty levels  market pressure  media coverage

中文摘要:

      证监会实施随机现场检查以来,监管效能得到显著提升,该制度成为规范资本市场信息披露的重要制度创新。以2016年证监会全面开展的随机现场检查为外生冲击,选取2013—2022年中国A股上市公司数据,考察了随机监管对上市公司策略性文本信息披露的影响及其机制。研究发现,上市公司被纳入随机现场检查名单后,策略性文本信息披露得到约束,文本信息更加客观,具体表现为年报语调积极性降低,语调操纵减少。机制检验结果表明,随机监管影响策略性文本信息披露的关键在于监管处罚力度加大形成的正式约束效应以及市场压力和负面媒体报道增加带来的非正式约束效应。异质性分析发现,随机监管的约束效应在有政治关联的民营上市公司,以及治理水平较低和法治环境较差地区的上市公司中更显著。因此,监管部门应持续落实并进一步优化随机监管制度,充分发挥随机监管、结果公开的约束作用,全面有效地规范上市公司的信息披露行为,促进资本市场高质量发展。

英文摘要:

      Since the implementation of random on-site inspections by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), regulatory effectiveness has significantly improved, marking an important institutional innovation for strengthening information disclosure discipline in China's capital market. Taking the CSRC's nationwide rollout of random on-site inspections in 2016 as an exogenous shock, this paper examines the impact of random supervision on the strategic textual disclosure of listed firms and its underlying mechanisms, based on data from China's A-share listed firms from 2013 to 2022. The findings reveal that listed firms included in the random on-site inspection list exhibit less strategic textual disclosure, specifically reflected in a reduced positive tone in annual reports and a decrease in tone manipulation. Mechanism tests reveal that the binding effect of random supervision on strategic textual disclosure operates through the formal constraint effect resulting from increased regulatory penalties, as well as the informal constraint effect arising from heightened market pressure and negative media coverage. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the constraint effect of random supervision is more pronounced for private listed firms with political connections, as well as for listed firms with lower governance quality and operating in weaker legal environments. Therefore, regulatory authorities should continue to implement and further optimize the random supervision system, fully leverage the binding effect of random supervision and public disclosure of results, and comprehensively and effectively regulate listed firms' information disclosure behavior, so as to promote high-quality development of the capital market.