高管激励调整、会计信息质量与公司股价崩盘风险

Executive Incentive Adjustment, Accounting Information Quality and the Risk of Stock Price Collapse

中文关键词:  高管激励调整  股价崩盘风险  会计信息质量  分析师关注度  企业生命周期

英文关键词:executive incentive adjustment  risk of stock price collapse  quality of accounting information  analyst attention  enterprise life cycle

中文摘要:

      高管作为企业运营的核心主体,其薪酬激励方式的选择与调整是决定公司风险防控和未来发展的关键因素。以2007—2020年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了高管激励调整对公司股价崩盘风险的影响及作用机制。研究发现,高管激励调整、高管激励方式由现金调整为股票期权、高管激励调整次数上升均能够显著降低上市公司股价崩盘风险,且会计信息质量在高管激励调整对公司股价崩盘风险的影响中发挥了部分中介效应。异质性分析表明,高管激励调整对股价崩盘风险的缓解效应仅显著存在于处于成长期或成熟期(而非衰退期)以及分析师关注度较高的企业中。因此,企业应建立相对灵活的薪酬激励长效机制,根据不同生命周期设计合理的奖惩制度,并适度调整契约条款,进而防范公司股价崩盘风险。

英文摘要:

      The selection and adjustment of compensation incentive plans for executives, a core figure of enterprise operation, are key factors determining the future development and risk prevention and control of a company. This paper focuses on Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2020 and empirically examines the effect of executive incentive adjustments on the risk of stock price collapse and its underlying mechanisms. The results show that the behavior, direction, and frequency of executive incentive adjustments significantly reduce the risk of stock price collapse, and the quality of accounting information exerts a partial mediating effect. This study also reveals that the mitigating effect of executive incentive adjustments on the risk of stock price collapse is only significant in enterprises during the growth or mature period (rather than the recession period) and those with high analyst attention. Therefore, enterprises should establish a relatively flexible long-term compensation incentive mechanism, design rational reward and penalty systems based on different stages of the life cycle, and make moderate adjustments to contract terms to mitigate the risk of stock price collapse. 