共同机构投资者能否促进上市公司高质量发展？——基于公司违规视角

Can Common Institutional Investors Promote High-quality Development of Listed Companies? —A Corporate Violations Perspective

中文关键词:  共同机构投资者  投资组合公司  公司违规  行业协同效应  监督治理效应  资源聚集效应

英文关键词:common institutional investors  portfolio companies  corporate violations  industrial synergy effect  supervisory governance effect  resource aggregation effect

中文摘要:

      有效提高上市公司质量是学术研究的热点,也是监管机构监管的重难点,更是中国经济高质量发展的微观基础。基于一种新兴市场化机制——共同机构投资者出现的契机,运用2007—2021年中国A股上市公司数据,考察了共同机构投资者与公司违规的关系。研究发现,共同机构投资者通过发挥行业协同、监督治理和资源聚集效应抑制了投资组合公司违规行为。进一步分析发现:共同机构投资者能够有效减少投资组合公司的信息披露违规和经营违规,而对领导人违规行为的抑制作用有限；长期共同机构投资者对投资组合公司违规行为的治理效应更明显；共同机构投资者对投资组合公司违规行为的抑制作用在企业经营风险高、行业竞争程度低和媒体关注度高时更大；并且,共同机构投资者能够有效削弱投资组合公司违规与经营业绩的负相关关系。因此,政府应充分发挥共同机构投资者的协同治理作用,公司应努力培育和保持核心竞争力吸引共同机构投资者持股,以促进公司高质量发展。

英文摘要:

      Effectively improving the quality of listed companies is a hot topic in academic research, a major challenge for regulators, and a micro-foundation for the high-quality development of China's economy. Leveraging the emergence of an emerging market-based mechanism—common institutional investors, this study uses the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 to investigate the correlation between common institutional investors and corporate violations. The results reveal that common institutional investors suppress violations of portfolio companies by exerting the effects of industrial synergy, supervisory governance and resource aggregation. Further analysis reveals that common institutional investors can effectively reduce disclosure and operational violations in portfolio companies, but have a limited effect on leadership violations; long-term common institutional investors are more competent in managing violations in portfolio companies; the inhibitory effect of common institutional investors on violations of portfolio companies becomes more pronounced in situations where there is a higher level of business risk, lower industrial competition, and heightened media attention; common institutional investors can effectively weaken the negative correlation between violations of portfolio companies and business performance. Therefore, The government should fully leverage the synergistic governance role of common institutional investors, while companies should strive to cultivate and maintain core competitiveness to attract common institutional investors for shareholding, thereby facilitating the high-quality development of companies.