薪酬—级别倒挂与公司慈善捐赠

Salary-Rank Inversion and Corporate Charitable Donations

中文关键词:  国有企业集团  薪酬制度改革  薪酬—级别倒挂  慈善捐赠  迎合动机

英文关键词:state-owned enterprise groups  salary system reform  salary-rank inversion  charitable donation  catering motivation

中文摘要:

      公司的慈善捐赠是直接增进社会福利的有效手段,探究公司捐赠决策的行为逻辑具有重要意义。基于2015—2019年国有企业集团下属A股上市公司数据,考察了公司高管获得高于其所属集团负责人薪酬的薪酬—级别倒挂现象对慈善捐赠的影响。研究发现:薪酬—级别倒挂会促使公司高管出于迎合集团的动机增加慈善捐赠,即薪酬—级别倒挂程度越高,公司的慈善捐赠水平越高。区分慈善捐赠性质的检验表明,薪酬—级别倒挂影响下的捐赠主要是非连续、策略性捐赠,支持了迎合假说。进一步分析发现,迎合动机强烈、迎合难度更高以及迎合效果更好时,薪酬—级别倒挂对公司慈善捐赠的影响更明显。因此,国有企业集团在激励下属公司积极承担社会责任时,可以将其相应的考核机制与薪酬体系结合,从而实现更好的激励效果。

英文摘要:

      Corporate charitable donations serve as an effective means of directly enhancing social welfare, making it significant to explore the behavioral logic behind corporate donation decisions. This study leverages data from A-share listed companies affiliated with state-owned enterprise groups from 2015 to 2019 to explore how the phenomenon of “salary-rank inversion”, where the salary of executives surpasses that of group leaders, affects corporate charitable donations. The study finds that salary-rank inversion motivates corporate executives to increase charitable donations to cater to the groups. In other words, higher levels of salary-rank inversion lead to higher levels of corporate charitable donations. Upon distinguishing the nature of charitable donations, the examination reveals that donations under the influence of salary-rank inversion are mainly discontinuous and tactical, thus the hypothesis that companies cater to SOE groups is supported. Further analysis shows that the effect of salary-rank inversion on corporate charitable donations is more obvious when the motivation to cater to SOE groups is stronger, the difficulty of catering is higher, or the result of catering is better. As a result, when state-owned enterprise groups encourage their subsidiary companies to actively undertake social responsibilities, integrating corresponding performance assessment mechanisms with salary systems can lead to better incentive effects. 