产业政策会影响上市公司盈余预告自愿披露吗？——基于政策信号传递效应视角

Will Industrial Policy Affect Listed Companies' Voluntary Disclosure of Surplus Forecast? A Perspective of Policy Signaling Effect

中文关键词:  产业政策  盈余预告  自愿披露  市场化程度  分析师关注  短期市场反应

英文关键词:industrial policy  surplus forecast  voluntary disclosure  marketization  analyst coverage  short-term market response

中文摘要:

      产业政策是政府资源配置的导向信号,对上市公司管理层信息披露行为具有重要影响。基于2006—2019年我国A股上市公司自愿性盈余预告数据,实证检验了产业政策引导管理层盈余预告自愿披露的作用路径。研究发现,产业政策信号传递具有引导管理层盈余预告自愿披露的积极作用；且在市场化程度较高的地区,以及分析师关注度较高的企业,该积极作用更显著。进一步研究发现,管理层顺应产业政策导向主动披露盈余预告能够引起更为正向的市场反应,获取超额收益。因此,政府应关注产业政策信号传递在信息市场中的正向作用,以及区域差异性和分析师行为对这一过程的影响,从而使得产业政策实施效果最优化。

英文摘要:

      As guiding signals of governmental resource allocation, industrial policy has an important bearing on the information disclosure behavior of listed companies' management. Based on China's A-share listed companies' voluntary surplus forecast data, this paper empirically tested the ways in which industrial policy instructs such companies' management to voluntarily disclose surplus forecast. It is found that industrial policy signaling plays a positive role in guiding the management to voluntarily disclose surplus forecast, and such positive effect is more pronounced in areas with high-level marketization and among enterprises with large analyst coverage. Further, if the management can comply with industrial policy instruction to voluntarily disclose surplus forecast, it will give rise to more positive short-term market response, and extra revenues will be gained. Therefore, the government should focus on the positive effect of industrial policy signaling in the information market, and the impact of regional differences and analysts' behavior on this process, in order to make the implementation of industrial policy more effective. 