市场竞争如何影响国有上市企业创新产出？——兼论“限薪令”的调节效应

How Does Market Competition Affect the Innovation Performance of State-owned Listed Companies? —On the Moderating Effects of Executive Compensation Regulation

中文关键词:  国有上市企业  创新产出  市场竞争  限薪令  公司治理  专利

英文关键词:state-owned listed enterprises  innovation output  competition  executive compensation regulation  governance  patent

中文摘要:

      构建新发展格局,实现高质量发展亟须提升我国国有企业技术创新能力。创新不仅需要资本的支持,而且需要公司治理的保障。基于3543家A股上市企业2003—2019年的非平衡面板数据,实证检验了在资本市场治理下,市场竞争能否促进国有上市企业创新产出,“限薪令”又如何影响竞争与国有上市企业创新的关系。研究发现,市场竞争的加剧显著改善了国有上市企业创新产出,并且“限薪令”的实施强化了市场竞争对国有上市企业创新的正向影响。机制检验结果表明,市场竞争通过削减国有股东带来的政策性负担进而促进了国有上市企业创新产出。但是,市场竞争只有对公司治理水平较高的国有上市企业才能形成创新效应。可见,产权并非企业创新的直接决定因素,治理质量较高的国有上市企业可以通过市场竞争推动创新发展；同时,“限薪令”存在正外部性,能够与市场竞争在国有企业创新治理方面实现协同效应。

英文摘要:

      To create a new development dynamic and achieve high-quality development calls for enhancing the technological innovation capability of Chinese state-owned enterprises. Innovation hinges both on capital investment and solid corporate governance. Based on the unbalanced panel data of 3543 A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2019, this paper empirically tests 1) whether market competition can improve the innovation performance of state-owned listed companies under the background of capital market governance; and 2) how the Executive Compensation Regulation affects the relationship between competition and innovation of state-owned listed companies. This study finds that intensified market competition significantly improves the innovation performance of state-owned listed enterprises and implementation of the Executive Compensation Regulation boosts the positive effects of market competition on the innovation performance of state-owned listed enterprises. Mechanism analysis shows that market competition improves the innovation performance of state-owned listed enterprises through lessening the policy burdens created by the state stakeholder. However, the positive effects of market competition on innovation performance can only be observed in those state-owned listed companies with a high level of corporate governance. It shows that property right is not a determining factor for enterprise innovation, and state-owned listed enterprises with high governance quality can achieve innovative development through market competition. Meanwhile, the Executive Compensation Regulation has positive externalities. Accompany with, and it can achieve synergy with market cornpetition in the aspects of innovation and governance of state-owned enterprises.