激励目标异质性与高管薪酬契约——来自国有企业分类的经验证据

Incentive Target Heterogeneity and Executive Compensation Contracts —Evidence from the Classification of SOEs

中文关键词:  激励目标异质性  商业类企业  公益类企业  薪酬业绩敏感性  冗员负担  过度投资

英文关键词:target heterogeneity  commercial enterprise  public welfare enterprise  pay-performance sensitivity  redundant employees  over-investment

中文摘要:

      国有企业在整个国民经济中处于十分重要的地位,其高管薪酬契约也广受关注。以2007—2019年我国国有上市公司为研究样本,将国有企业分为公益类和商业类,研究了不同类别国有企业薪酬业绩敏感性的差异及实现路径。研究发现:(1)公益类国有企业比商业类国有企业薪酬业绩敏感性更低；(2)公益类国有企业因为承担超额雇员、过度投资而降低了薪酬业绩敏感性。进一步研究发现,在市场化程度较低的地区,公益类国有企业比商业类国有企业承担更多的冗员和过度投资,从而降低了薪酬业绩敏感性；企业规模越大,公益类国有企业和商业类国有企业冗员负担、过度投资和薪酬业绩敏感性差异越显著。因此,考核国有企业高管时可以将政策性指标纳入考核范围,且合理设置财务业绩指标和政策指标的结构和比例,从而使薪酬契约发挥最优的激励效果。

英文摘要:

      State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are important players in the national economy of China, and the executive compensation contracts of SOEs are hot topics among the general public. Taking China's state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as the sample, this paper first classifies China's SOEs into public welfare enterprises and commercial enterprises, and then examines the different pay-performance sensitivity of different types of SOEs and the mechanisms behind these differences. Researchers find that:(1) public welfare enterprises have weaker pay-performance sensitivity than commercial enterprises; (2) the lower pay-performance sensitivity of public welfare enterprises results from redundant employees and over-investment. Further studies show that differences of public welfare enterprises and commercial enterprises in redundant employees, over-investment and pay-performance sensitivity become more significant if they are in areas with low degree of marketization or large-scale enterprises. This paper suggests that policy-related indicators should be included in the performance assessment of SOE executives. Specifically, more efforts should be made to set reasonable financial performance indicators on the one hand and properly design the structure and weight of policy-related indicators on the other, so as to make the compensation contracts play the optimal incentive effect.