A股上市公司经理人现金薪酬与业绩真的挂钩吗？——基于CEO个体时间序列数据的研究

Is the Cash Compensation of Executives in A-share Listed Companies Really Linked to Performance? Evidence Based on CEOs' Individual Time Series Data

中文关键词:  经理人激励  现金薪酬  薪酬—业绩敏感度  任期  匹配假说

英文关键词:executive incentive  cash compensation  pay-performance sensitivity  tenure  matching hypothesis

中文摘要:

      关于A股上市公司经理人现金薪酬与公司对外报告的会计业绩是否挂钩,已有的主流文献给出了“是”的答案。基于2000—2019年A股上市公司CEO个体时间序列数据逐个进行回归,研究发现A股上市公司CEO现金薪酬总体上并没有与其所在公司业绩挂钩,即不存在显著正向的薪酬—业绩敏感度,这与主流文献基于传统面板数据下所得到的显著为正、幅值较小的研究结论截然不同。经测算,3317位A股公司CEO中只有33位具有显著为正 的薪酬—业绩敏感度,但由于这些CEO整体现金薪酬水平偏低,实际上,随着公司业绩的变动,他们的现金薪酬变动并不大,不具有明显的经济意义。因此,A股上市公司的股东和监管机构需要反思和重构包括现金薪酬与股权激励在内的经理人薪酬激励机制,学术界也应重新评估已有相关文献的结论。

英文摘要:

      Regarding whether the cash compensation of executives in A-share listed companies is linked to the company's externally reported accounting performance, the mainstream literature research has answered ‘yes’. Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2000 to 2019, by running regressions one by one on the individual time series data of the CEOs in A-share listed companies, the paper documents that CEOs' cash compensation of listed companies in China, generally speaking, are not significantly linked to their performance. In other words, there is no significant and positive pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) for most CEOs, in contrast to the traditional findings arising from the cross-sectional approach which shows significantly positive but with a small amplitude one. According to our calculations, only 33 out of 3317 CEOs in A-share companies have significantly positive PPS, however, due to the overall low cash compensation level of these CEOs, in fact, as the company's performance changes, their cash compensation does not change much, which has no obvious economic significance. Therefore, shareholders and regulators of A-share listed companies need to reflect and reconstruct the manager compensation incentive mechanism including cash compensation and equity incentives, and scholars should review and rethink the existing executive incentive studies.