股东资源理论与国有企业混合所有制改革:基于中国联通的案例

Theory of Shareholders' Resources and Mixed Ownership Reform of SOEs:Based on the Case of China Unicom

中文关键词:  股东资源  国有企业  混合所有制改革  公司治理  混合所有制改革模式  股东结构

英文关键词:shareholder's resource  state-owned enterprise (SOE)  mixed ownership reform (MOR)  corporate governance  mixed ownership reform mode  shareholder structure

中文摘要:

      中国经济的持续增长,离不开国有企业与民营企业股东资源的互补与共生发展。国有企业混合所有制改革,既是股东结构的重构,更是各种股东资源的聚合与效应发挥。基于中国联通“二次混改”经典案例,对混合所有制改革要素进行了逻辑归纳,系统论述了国有企业混合所有制改革中股东资源的作用逻辑与机理——“混”的是股东资源(物质基础),“改”的是公司治理(上层建筑)。因此,国有企业混合所有制改革应重点关注外部大股东的准入门槛,以资源异质性和资源优势互补性为根本选择混合所有制改革模式,发挥混合所有制改革后大股东联盟的良序治理,并动态优化股东资源,完善股东进入和退出机制。

英文摘要:

      The sustainable growth of China's economy cannot live without the complementary and symbiotic development of the shareholders' resources in the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the privately-owned enterprises (POEs). The mixed ownership reform (MOR) in the SOEs is not only the reconstruction of shareholder structure but also the aggregation and effect of various shareholders' resources. Based on the typical case of China Unicom in its “secondary mixed reform”, this paper makes a logical summary on the elements of MOR, and systematically highlights the logic and mechanism of shareholders' resources in MOR——“mixed” with shareholders' resources (material basis), “reform” in corporate governance (superstructure). Therefore, the MOR in the SOEs should focus on the access threshold of external big shareholders, choose the mixed reform mode based on resource heterogeneity and complementarity of resource advantage, give full play to the orderly governance of major shareholder alliance after the mixed reform, dynamically optimize shareholder resources and improve the mechanism of shareholder's access and withdrawal. 