管理层股权激励与实体企业金融化

Management Equity Incentive and Corporate Financialization

中文关键词:  股权激励  金融化  脱实向虚  实体经济  代理成本  利益协同

英文关键词:equity incentive  financialization  off the real to the virtual  real economy  agency cost  interest convergence

中文摘要:

      如何避免实体企业“脱实向虚”事关金融体系稳定与实体经济可持续发展。基于2006—2019年A股非金融上市公司数据,研究发现:管理层股权激励对实体企业金融化具有显著的抑制作用。异质性分析表明,相较于国有企业,这一作用在民营企业中更为显著。进一步研究发现,当股东监督力度较小、治理环境较薄弱时,管理层股权激励对实体企业金融化的抑制作用更加明显,这是由于股权激励通过加强管理层与股东之间的利益协同效应,进而对实体企业金融化产生了抑制作用；且管理层股权激励能够促进实体企业“脱虚向实”,即通过抑制金融资产配置,促进企业进行长期实业投资和创新投资。因此,企业应进一步完善薪酬激励机制,避免可能诱发的机会主义行为；政府应加强对股权激励实施方案的监管,助推实体企业“脱虚向实”；金融部门应健全动态金融风险防范预警机制,有效防范和化解系统性金融风险。

英文摘要:

      How to avoid the “off the real to the virtual” of real enterprises is related to the stability of the financial system and the sustainable development of the real economy. Based on the data of A-share non-financial listed companies during the year from 2006 to 2019, this paper shows that corporate financialization is negatively related with management equity incentive. Heterogeneity analysis finds that the effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises than in state-owned ones. Further analysis shows that the negative effect of management equity incentive on corporate financialization is more pronounced in the companies with weak shareholder supervision and weak governance environment, which supports that management equity incentive reduces corporate financialization by strengthening the convergence of interest between management and shareholders. In addition, this paper also shows that management equity incentive can promote capital expenditure and innovation investment by restraining the allocation of financial assets, which is helpful for “off the virtual to the real”. The government should strengthen the supervision of equity incentive plans, improve the dynamic mechanism for preventing financial risks, and effectively prevent and defuse systemic financial risks. 