薪酬管制与国企高管行为——基于“不作为”和“乱作为”视角

Salary Regulation and Executive Behavior of State-owned Enterprises from Perspectives of “Inaction” and “Disorderly Action”

中文关键词:  薪酬管制  经营业绩  投资规模  超额在职消费  “不作为”  “乱作为” 

英文关键词:salary regulation  business performance  investment scale  exceeded in-service consumption  “inaction”  “disorderly behavior”

中文摘要:

      如何合理设计国企高管的薪酬契约,形成对国企高管的有效监督和激励,一直是深化国企改革的重要命题,尤其是薪酬管制政策的实施是否会滋生新的机会主义行为值得进一步研究。基于2011—2018年A股非金融类上市公司数据,检验了2015年以来的薪酬管制政策对国企高管行为的影响。研究发现,政策实施后,管制前薪酬水平较高的国企,其经营业绩、投资规模和超额在职消费均显著降低。说明薪酬管制政策会提高国企高管“不作为”的倾向,但也会抑制国企高管的“乱作为”。进一步分析发现,地方政府干预程度越高的地区,这种效应越显著。因此,政府在薪酬改革过程中应关注薪酬管制政策对管理层激励的影响,建议将国企高管薪酬与企业业绩挂钩,避免管理层的“不作为”。

英文摘要:

      How to design reasonably the remuneration contract for the state-owned enterprise (SOE) executives and form the effective supervision and incentive to executives has always been an important topic in the deepening reform of SOEs. It is worth further study whether the implementation of salary restriction will breed new opportunistic behaviors. Base on the data of A-share non-financial listed companies during the years from 2011 to 2018, the research tests the impact of salary regulation policies on the behavior of the SOE executives since 2015.The research finds that after the implementation of the salary regulation policies, the operating performance, investment scale and the exceeded in-service consumption in the SOEs at a higher salary level before the salary regulation are significantly lowered. This means that the salary regulation policies tend to increase the “inaction” of executives in the SOEs, but they also reduce their “disorderly behavior”. Further analysis reveals that this effect is more pronounced in areas where the degree of local government intervention is high. Therefore, the government should pay attention to the impact of salary regulation policies on executive incentives during the remuneration reform process, and link the remuneration of executives in SOEs with performance to avoid “inaction”. 