强制性分红政策的公司治理作用研究

Research on Corporate Governance Effect of Mandatory Dividend Policy

中文关键词:  强制性分红政策  代理成本  公司治理  集团权利分配  形成路径  控制链层级

英文关键词:mandatory dividend policy  agency cost  corporate governance  group rights distribution  formation path  control chain level

中文摘要:

      在我国制度背景下,中央企业基本都采用集团化的经营模式,股东与经理之间的代理问题一直是国有企业治理的焦点问题。基于我国中央企业强制性分红政策所提供的契机,以我国2004—2018年中央企业和民营企业上市公司为样本,采用双重差分法考察了强制性分红政策的公司治理作用。研究表明,随着强制性分红政策的实施以及收益收取比例的逐步提高,央企上市公司股东与经理之间的代理问题得到了改善。进一步研究发现,集团内部权利分配方式影响了强制性分红政策治理作用的发挥,即相对于“先子后母”企业,“先母后子”企业强制性分红政策的治理效果更好。因而,适当提高强制性分红比例、加强集团母公司的控制权可以有效缓解股东与经理之间的代理问题,提高公司价值。

英文摘要:

      In the context of China's system, the central enterprises basically adopt the collectivized business model, and the agency problem between shareholders and managers has always been the focus of the corporate governance in the state-owned enterprises (SOE). Based on the opportunity provided by the mandatory dividend policy of China's central enterprises, taking China's central enterprises and private listed companies during the years from 2004 to 2018 as samples, this paper uses the double difference method to investigate the corporate governance effect of the mandatory dividend policy. The research shows that with the implementation of mandatory dividend policy and the gradual increase in the proportion of revenue collection, the agency problem between shareholders and managers of listed companies has been improved. Further research shows that the distribution of rights within the group affects the governance effect of mandatory dividend policy, that is, compared with the “subsidiary first and then parent company” enterprise, the “parent company first and then subsidiary” enterprise has a better governance effect of mandatory dividend policy. Therefore, appropriate increase in the proportion of mandatory dividends and strengthening control of parent company in the group can effectively alleviate the shareholder-manager agency problem and improve the firm value. 