张新民,陈帅,卿琛.盈余管理的新策略:来自母子公司交易的经验证据[J].北京工商大学社科版,2021,36(2):38-50
盈余管理的新策略:来自母子公司交易的经验证据
A New Strategy of Earnings Management:Evidence from Transactions in Parent-Subsidiary Companies
投稿时间:2020-10-21  
DOI:10.12085/j.issn.1009-6116.2021.02.004
中文关键词:  母子公司交易  盈余管理  合并净利润  归母净利润  少数股东损益  信息含量
英文关键词:transaction of parent-subsidiary companies  earnings management  consolidated earnings  earnings attributed to owners of parent company  profit and loss of minority shareholder  information content
基金项目:国家自然科学基金重大项目“互联网时代的公司财务行为研究”(71790604);国家自然科学基金青年项目“内部控制、风险承担及其经济后果:基于差异化目标导向视角的研究”(71702030);国家自然科学基金重点项目“审计机构治理机制与审计质量研究” (71932003)。
作者单位
张新民 对外经济贸易大学 国际商学院, 北京 100029 
陈帅 对外经济贸易大学 国际商学院, 北京 100029 
卿琛 国网能源研究院 财会与审计研究所, 北京 102209 
摘要点击次数: 277
全文下载次数: 419
中文摘要:
      现有关于盈余管理的研究仅限定在合并公司层面,鲜有关注母子公司之间可能存在的盈余管理行为。以我国2007—2017年A股上市公司为样本,理论分析并实证检验了上市公司总体上是否存在母子公司之间的盈余管理行为。研究发现:母公司会通过转移非全资子公司少数股东损益的形式对归属于母公司所有者的净利润进行盈余管理;当上市公司避免业绩亏损或下滑、盈余达标和融资需求的动机越强时,母子公司之间的盈余管理程度越高;进一步地,母子公司间的盈余管理与真实盈余管理存在显著的替代效应,而并没有证据发现其与应计盈余管理存在替代或互补关系。研究结论表明,要格外关注盈余操纵的新形式,警惕更为隐蔽的母子公司之间的盈余管理行为。监管机构要增强对母子公司交易动机、过程及信息披露的监管,以更好地维护中小投资者的合法权益。
英文摘要:
      The existing research on earnings management is limited to the consolidated company, but little attention has been paid to the behavior of earnings management in the parent and subsidiary companies. Based on China’s A-share listed companies during the years from 2007 to 2017 as the research sample, this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests whether there is the behavior of earnings management in the parent and subsidiary companies in China. The results show that a parent company can manage earnings attributed to the owners of parent company by transferring the profit and loss of minority shareholder from non-wholly-owned subsidiaries. The stronger the motivations to avoid the losses and decline in their performance and to meet the target earnings and financing demand, the higher the degree of earnings management between parent and subsidiary companies. Further analysis finds that there is a significant substitution effect between parent-subsidiary earnings management and real earnings management, but no evidence shows that it has the substitution or replacement relationship with accrual earnings management. The research results show that special attention should be paid to the new forms of earnings management, guard against the more stealthy earnings management in parent and subsidiary companies. The relevant regulatory authorities should strengthen the supervision over parent-subsidiary companies concerning their transaction motivation, process and information disclosure so as to better protect the legitimate rights of minority investors. 
查看全文  查看/发表评论  下载PDF阅读器
关闭