李宇立,梁娟,袁晓红.互捐行为中捐出方的运行效率——以企业背景公益基金会为研究对象[J].北京工商大学社科版,2020,35(6):42-55
互捐行为中捐出方的运行效率——以企业背景公益基金会为研究对象
Operational Efficiency of Donators under Interactive Donation Based on Corporate Background Charity Foundations
投稿时间:2020-04-30  
DOI:10.12085/j.issn.1009-6116.2020.06.004
中文关键词:  交互捐赠  资源依赖  委托代理  效率  秩和比(RSR)法  公益基金会
英文关键词:interactive donation  resource dependence  principal-agent  efficiency  Rank Sum Ratio (RSR)  charity foundation
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“公益基金组织运行中的‘伪效率’问题研究”(71864033);国家留学基金项目(201908655022)。
作者单位
李宇立 新疆财经大学 会计学院, 新疆 乌鲁木齐 830012 
梁娟 新疆财经大学 会计学院, 新疆 乌鲁木齐 830012 
袁晓红 新疆财经大学 会计学院, 新疆 乌鲁木齐 830012 
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中文摘要:
      公益基金会之间存在较为普遍的互捐现象。以2015—2018年企业背景和配对的非企业背景基金会为样本,基于I-P-O模型和RSR法,分别度量了公益基金会的资源获取能力、组织管理效率、项目运行效率和综合运行效率。研究发现,在公益基金会的互捐行为中,有企业背景的捐出方,其综合运行效率显著地高于其他公益基金会。其中,凭借可依赖的企业发起人,企业背景公益基金会获得了较强的资源获取能力和组织管理效率;交互捐赠的受赠基金会为其提供了公益资源输出渠道进而提升了项目运行效率。但是,在向其他基金会进行大额捐赠的企业背景基金会中,慈善资源的沉积现象明显。资源依赖产生的正效率和委托代理关系叠加带来的效率损失同时存在,且不排除存在“伪效率”问题的可能性。政府通过加大对公益基金会间捐赠行为和信息披露的监管,以及对捐赠资金使用情况的监督,有助于提升社会资源的配置效率。
英文摘要:
      There is a common phenomenon of mutual donation among charity foundations. Based on the I-P-O model and the Rank Sum Ratio (RSR) method, with corporate background and paired non-corporate background foundations during the years from 2015 to 2018 as samples, this paper respectively measures the resource acquisition ability, organization management efficiency, project operation efficiency and comprehensive operation efficiency of charity foundations. This study has found that the comprehensive operation efficiency of corporate background charity foundations as donors in interactive donations is significantly higher than other charity foundations. Among them, by relying on the sponsors of enterprises, corporate background foundations have obtained strong resource acquisition capabilities and organizational management efficiency. The donated foundations with interactive donations have provided channels for the output of public welfare resources to improve the efficiency of project operations. However, in corporate foundations that make big donations to other foundations, the accumulation of charitable resources is obvious. The positive efficiency generated by resource dependence and the efficiency loss caused by the overlapping principal-agent relationship coexist, and the possibility of “pseudo-efficiency” could not be ruled out. The regulatory authorities should strengthen the supervision on the donation behavior and information disclosure among charity foundations, as well as the supervision on the use of donated funds, which contributes to the improving the efficiency of social resource allocation. 
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