供应商—客户关系与代理成本

Supplier-Customer Relationship and Agency Costs Based on Moderating Role of Incentives for Executives

中文关键词:  供应链  关系型交易  代理成本  高管激励  高管持股

英文关键词:supply chain  relational transaction  agency cost  incentive for executives  executive shareholding

中文摘要:

      关系交易作为中国企业间交易的典型模式,其对代理成本产生的影响尚不明确。以2012—2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究了供应商—客户关系对企业代理成本的影响。研究发现,关系型交易与两类代理成本均呈显著的U型关系。即在关系型交易初期,随着关系型交易的深入,两类代理成本均有所降低；但随着关系型交易深入的程度超过拐点,两类代理成本会上升。进一步研究发现,高管持股会正向调节关系交易与第一类代理成本之间的关系,但对第二类代理成本的调节作用不显著。供应商—客户关系与代理成本之间的关系,为合作双方适度把握关系型交易的深度与频率,最大程度地发挥关系型交易的优势作用提供了经验证据。企业要认识到高管持股对代理成本的影响,充分发挥其对第一类代理成本的抑制作用。

英文摘要:

      As a typical mode of transactions between Chinese enterprises, it is still unclear how relational transaction affects agency costs. Taking the A-share listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the years from 2012 to 2018 as the sample, the impact of supplier-customer relationships on agency costs is studied. The research finds that relational transaction and two types of agency costs are of an obvious U-shape relationship. That is, the two types of agency costs decrease at the initial stage of relational transaction, but increase as the degree of relational transaction exceeds the turning point. Further study finds that executive shareholding has a positive regulating effect on the relationship between relational transactions and the first-type agency costs, but it has no significant regulating effect on the second-type agency costs. The changes between supplier-customer relationship and agency costs provide the empirical evidence on how two cooperative parties grasp properly the relational transactions in both depth and frequency so that relational transactions can play a role to the maximum. The companies should realize the impact of executive shareholding on agency costs, and give full play to the inhibitory effect of it on the first type of agency costs. 