周泽将,汪帅.本地独立董事能否有效抑制国有企业高管在职消费?[J].北京工商大学社科版,2020,35(1):35-49
本地独立董事能否有效抑制国有企业高管在职消费?
Can Local Independent Directors Effectively Inhibit Non-pecuniary Compensation by Executives in China's SOEs?
投稿时间:2019-09-06  
DOI:10.12085/j.issn.1009-6116.2020.01.004
中文关键词:  本地独立董事  国有企业  在职消费  政治关联  政府补贴  经营绩效
英文关键词:local independent director  state-owned enterprise (SOE)  non-pecuniary compensation  political connections  government subsidy  business performance
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“本地任职、政治关联与企业财务行为:中国关系情境中独立董事视角的理论构建与实证检验”(71772001);安徽省高校学科(专业)拔尖人才资助项目(gxbjZD02)。
作者单位
周泽将 安徽大学 商学院, 安徽 合肥 230601 
汪帅 安徽大学 商学院, 安徽 合肥 230601 
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中文摘要:
      独立董事作为公司治理机制的重要组成部分,其监督职能能否有效发挥长期以来备受关注。基于此,以任职地点为切入点,采用中国资本市场A股国有控股上市公司2010—2016年期间5489个观察数据,实证考察本地独立董事对国有企业高管在职消费的影响以及政治关联和政府补贴在其中发挥的调节作用。研究发现:本地独立董事显著抑制了国有企业高管在职消费,且政治关联弱化了本地独立董事的抑制作用,而政府补贴则增强了本地独立董事的抑制功能。进一步考察发现,高管在职消费在本地独立董事提高国有企业经营绩效的过程中发挥了部分中介作用。由此提出国有企业,特别是政府补贴较高的国有企业,应重视对本地独立董事的聘任,充分发挥其监督功能,进而有效约束企业高管的在职消费行为,但同时也应注意到政治关联的可能负面影响。
英文摘要:
      As an important part of corporate governance mechanism, whether the supervisory function of independent directors can be effectively exerted has long been a matter of great concern. Based on this, with the 5489 observation data of A-share state-owned listed companies during the years from 2010 to 2016 on China's capital market, from a unique perspective of local tenure, this paper empirically tests the effect of local independent directors on non-pecuniary compensation by executives and the moderating effect of political connections and government subsidies. The results show that the local independent directors inhibit the non-pecuniary compensation by executives significantly in China's SOEs and political connections weaken the negative effect of local independent directors on non-pecuniary compensation, but government subsidies enhance the above relation. Further tests find that inhibiting the non-pecuniary compensation partly plays a mediator role in the process of local Independent directors affecting the business performance in SOEs. Accordingly, SOEs, especially those with high government subsidies, should attach importance to the appointment of local independent directors and fully utilizes their supervisory functions so that managers' non-pecuniary compensation can be effectively constrained. Meanwhile, attention should be also paid to the possible negative effect of political connections. 
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