企业高管内部人交易行为存在自我激励效应吗？——基于“八项规定”出台所构建的外生事件

Research on Self-motivation Effect in Internal Trading Behavior of Corporate Executives:Based on Exogenous Events after Promulgation of“Eight Rules”

中文关键词:  内部人交易  激励效应  八项规定  市场监督  分析师  机构投资者

英文关键词:insider trading  incentive effect  “Eight Rules”  market surveillance  analyst  institutional investor

中文摘要:

      学术界关于内部人交易的研究主要集中在对内部人交易的限制方面,而对内部人交易激励效应的讨论则鲜有涉及。基于2012年12月4日“八项规定”出台所构建的外生事件,选用2010—2015年相关数据研究发现:“八项规定”实施后,国有企业高管由于薪酬水平与在职消费受到限制,其内部人交易的获利能力显著增加,并且上述现象更多地集中于地方国有企业和东部地区国有企业。进一步研究显示,内部人交易获利能力上升的情况主要存在于分析师跟踪数较少、基金持股比例较高和合格境外投资者持股比例较低的上市公司中,这表明分析师跟踪及境外投资者持股存在市场监督效应,可以抑制内部人交易获利的增长。研究结论表明,关注内部人交易的自我激励效应、发挥市场监督作用是严格控制内部人交易的关键。

英文摘要:

      The academic research on insider trading mainly focuses on the restriction of insider trading, while the discussion on the incentive effect of insider trading is rarely involved. Based on the exogenous events since the “Eight Rules” promulgated on December 4,2, using the insider trading data during the years from 2010 to 2015, we find that after the implementation of the “Eight Rules”, the executives of the state-owned enterprises have significantly increased their profitability of insider trading due to the limitation of salary level and on-the-job consumption, the above phenomenon is more concentrated in the local state-owned enterprises and the state-owned listed companies in the eastern region. Further research shows that the increase in profitability of insider trading mainly exists in the listed companies with fewer analysts tracking, higher fund holdings and less shareholding ratio held by qualified foreign investors. This indicates that analysts track and overseas investor holdings have a market surveillance effect, which can curb the growth of insider trading profits. Therefore, the self-incentive effect of insider trading and its market supervision role are the key to strict control of insider trading.