终极超额控制与大股东的竞合关系对公司债务期限决策的影响

The Influence of Co-opetition Relationship between Ultimate Excess Controller and Major Shareholders upon Decision-making of Company's Debt Maturity

中文关键词:  终极控制人  大股东  超额控制  债务期限  共同治理  竞合关系

英文关键词:ultimate controller  major shareholder  excess control  debt maturity  joint governance  Co-opetition relationship

中文摘要:

      以2010—2016年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了终极控制人与大股东竞合关系对公司债务期限结构的影响。研究结果表明:终极超额控制与公司债务期限存在正“U”型关系；大股东和终极控制人形成的竞争力与公司债务期限结构负相关,大股东联合短期债权人对终极控制人自利行为进行约束,但这种约束力在终极控制人是政府股东及终极控制人是绝对控股股东时显著减弱；第二大股东与终极控制人股权性质一致与公司债务期限结构正相关,此时大股东和终极控制人更容易形成“合谋”关系。进一步研究发现,当第二大股东为信托股东时,更容易充当“旁观者”的角色,对公司债务期限的影响效应减弱,不再显著。而当第二大股东为受益股东时,和终极控制人形成了明显的“竞争”关系,对公司债务期限的影响效应增强。

英文摘要:

      Taking China's A-share listed companies in the years from 2010 to 2016 as research sample, this paper empirically tests the impact of Co-opetition relationship between ultimate controllers and major shareholders on a company's debt maturity structure. The research results show that there is a positive “U”-type relationship between ultimate excess control and company's debt maturity. The competitiveness formed by the major shareholders and the ultimate controller is negatively related to the structure of the company's debt maturity, and the major shareholders and the short-term creditors conduct the self-interest behavior of the ultimate controller. The constraint but binding force is significantly weakened when the ultimate controller is the government shareholder and the ultimate controller is the absolute controlling shareholder. The nature of the second largest shareholder and the ultimate controller is consistent with the corporate debt maturity structure. At this time, the majority shareholder and the ultimate controller are more likely to form a “collusion” relationship. Further research finds that when the second largest shareholder is a trust shareholder, it is easier to act as a “bystander” and the effect on the company's debt maturity is weakened and no longer significant. When the second largest shareholder is a beneficiary shareholder, it has formed an obvious “competitive” relationship with the ultimate controller, and the effect on the company's debt maturity has increasingly enhanced. 