高管—员工薪酬差距对企业绩效的影响——基于沪深A股上市公司的面板门限回归分析

The Impact of Executive-employee Compensation Gap on Enterprise Performance:Regression Analysis Based on Threshold Panel Model of China's A-stock Listed Companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange

中文关键词:  薪酬差距  企业绩效  倒U型  激励效应  面板门限模型  锦标赛理论  社会行为理论

英文关键词:compensation gap  enterprise performance  inverted U-shaped trend  incentive effect  threshold regression model  tournament theory  social behavior theory

中文摘要:

      国有企业是国民经济的主导力量,其内部薪酬差距对企业诸多方面具有重大影响。运用2006—2017年制造行业的国有上市公司的相关数据,采用面板数据固定效应模型研究了企业内部高管—员工薪酬差距与企业绩效之间的关系,进一步利用面板门限模型探讨了薪酬差距对企业绩效激励效应的门限水平。研究发现,薪酬差距与企业绩效之间存在倒U型的关系,这说明两者之间的关系不能简单地仅用锦标赛理论或行为理论来解释。另外,在薪酬差距的正向效应范围内存在显著的门限特征,在门限值(32.216)以下,薪酬差距对企业绩效有更强的激励效应,在门限值以上激励效应减弱。研究结论表明,应当深化国企改革,注重竞争和公平两个要素,科学设置薪酬差距区间,以充分发挥薪酬差距对企业绩效的正向激励效应。

英文摘要:

      State-owned enterprises are the dominant force in the national economy, and their internal pay gap has a major impact on many aspects of the enterprise. With the state-owned listed companies in the manufacturing industry during the years from 2006 to 2017 as a sample, this paper uses the fixed-effect panel data model to study the relationship of the compensation gap between executives and employees and enterprise performance. The threshold panel model is further used to explore the threshold level about the incentive effect of the compensation gap on enterprise performance. The research shows that there is an inverted “U”-shaped relationship between the compensation gap of executives and employees and enterprise performance. The research finds that the compensation gap has a positive incentive effect on enterprise performance, but when the compensation gap exceeds a certain range, it has a negative impact on enterprise performance. This also shows that the relationship of the compensation gap between executives and employees, and enterprise performance cannot be simply explained by the tournament theory or behavioral theory. In addition, there is a significant threshold characteristic within the positive incentive effect range of the compensation gap. Below the threshold value (32.216), the compensation gap has a stronger incentive effect on enterprise performance, and the incentive effect weakens above the threshold value. The conclusions of the study indicate that the reform of state-owned enterprises should be deepened, the two elements of competition and fairness should be emphasized, and the salary gap interval should be scientifically set to fully exert the positive incentive effect of the salary gap on corporate performance. 