分析师在企业风险承担中的作用:治理抑或压力

The Role of Financial Analysts in Firms' Risk-taking: Governance or Pressure

中文关键词:  分析师  风险承担  治理  压力  企业价值  创新

英文关键词:analyst  risk-taking  governance  pressure  firm value  innovation

中文摘要:

      现有基于国外数据的实证研究对于分析师在企业风险承担中发挥的作用尚存争论——“治理假说”和“压力假说”分别认为分析师跟踪会促进和抑制企业的风险承担。为进一步验证上述假说在我国的适用性,以我国A股非金融类上市公司为样本,进行了实证研究。结果表明:分析师跟踪提高了企业的风险承担水平,而且该增量效应在创新性较低的非高新技术企业以及竞争性水平较低的垄断性行业中更强。这说明,在我国市场中分析师跟踪的“治理假说”占主导。进一步分析发现,分析师跟踪通过提高企业风险承担水平增加了企业价值,且该价值效应在上述不同类型企业或行业间不存在显著差异。替换相关变量、控制内生性问题后,研究结论依然稳健。上述发现提供了分析师如何影响企业价值创造的具体证据,对于上市公司的外部治理生态优化及分析师行业发展具有一定的启示意义。

英文摘要:

      The current empirical studies based on foreign data still exists the debate on the role of financial analysts in corporate risk taking. “Governance Hypothesis” and “Pressure Hypothesis” predict that financial analysts' tracking will improve or inhibit firms' risk-taking respectively. In order to test the adaptability of the hypothesis above in China, this paper takes the sample of Chinese nonfinancial listed firms for empirical research, and finds that financial analysts' tracking improves firms' risk-taking, and such effect is more pronounced in non-high-tech firms and those in monopoly industries, which indicates that “Governance Hypothesis” of financial analysts' tracking dominates Chinese capital market. Further analysis shows that financial analysts' tracking has increased the firm value by improving their risk-taking and there is no significant difference among different firms and industries mentioned above. After alternating the related variables and controlling for potential endogeneity problems, the research conclusion remains robust. This paper provides concrete evidence on how financial analysts' tracking affects firms' value-creating activities and has important implication for the improvement of public firm's external governance ecology and the development of the industry of financial analysts.